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Consider

the

following

description

of an

advertisement

appearing in the October 1995 issue of the New York Mortgage Press.
A big-engined blonde is uncomfortably sprawled atop a
curvaceous motorcycle. On one side of the photo, her legs shoot
out of a black leather miniskirt barely ample enough to hide
thong underwear. On the other, her cleavage bulges out of a lowcut jacket. Her lips are slightly parted; her sunglasses reflect a

photographer' s flash.'
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I Mike France, How to Get Business Quickly Advertise!, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 11, 1995, at
A10. Some readers of the National LawJournal,however, took issue with its reporter's
description of Osias's October 1995 advertisement. In a letter to the editor, one
reader complained:
I was offended by your article on Rosalie Osias and her unorthodox
advertising campaign - not by Ms. Osias or her advertising, but by the
unfair and incorrect mischaracterization of the ads by your reporter.
The description in the lead paragraph made me wonder about the
extent of your reporter's bias; in fact, I found that description more
lurid, offensive and demeaning to Ms. Osias than the ad itself.
Your reporter measured the ads against "pornography-industry
standards" and compared them to ads for "a massage parlor, a lap
dance bar" or a "smutty" 1-900 chat line. The photograph you ran with
the article, however, seems no more suggestive than numerous ads in
mainstream publications.
The description of Ms. Osias as a "big-engined" woman whose
"cleavage bulges out of a low-cut jacket," "sprawled atop" a motorcycle
is not borne out by the ad, which shows barely a hint of Ms. Osias's
figure beneath a jacket no more low-cut than some I have seen on

SEX IN LEGAL ADVERTISING
One would imagine that this advertisement was promoting beer,
or sports cars, or even a Harley Davidson motorcycle, for that matter.
And yet, the New York Mortgage Press, a popular monthly journal
among bankers and mortgage brokers in southern New York,2 boasts
a sophisticated readership. It is hardly a forum for bike and beer ads.
Indeed, the October 1995 advertisement is not marketing
Harleys. Rather, the ad is promoting legal services, and the woman
depicted is Rosalie Osias, a real estate and banking attorney from
Long Island, New York.3 Astonishingly, Osias's advertisement is
targeted at mortgage brokers and mortgage companies as part of her
mortgage closing practice.
Her suggestive photograph is
accompanied by a provocative caption, comprising "an odd
combination of sexual double-entendre and mortgage-industry shop
talk," that proclaimed:

"WE WILL RIDE ANYTHING . .. TO GET

TO YOUR CLOSING ON TIME." 5
The October 1995 advertisement, however, was not the first time
that the New York banking lawyer from Cardozo Law School
employed sexual allure to flush out new clients.
Osias's first
advertisement appeared in the May 1995 issue of the New York
MortgagePress and sported a golf motif to coincide with the traditional
golf tournaments that the real estate industry holds during the
spring. The ad features Osias lying on a putting green, in black
leather pants and matching tuxedo, fondling the head of a golf club,
with an accompanying caption,
"We Don't Play Golf... We're Too
6
Busy Closing Your Loans.,

female attorneys in business suits. And although one of her legs is
tucked beneath her, she appears to be standing on the ground, not
sprawling atop the machine.
Jeffrey F. Fisher, Osias Article Was More Lascivious Than Her Ads, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 15,
1996, at A18. As a means of using sex to sell, Osias's ad is obviously timid by
mainstream standards. One need only view an evening of prime-time network
programming to appreciate the difference. By the legal profession's standards,
however, such a practice is unheard of, as Osias herself claims. See Melissa Tennen,
Should Lawyers Sell Their Bodies or Their Minds?, N.J. LAW.: WKLY. NEWSPAPER, Aug. 4,
1997, at 8 ("Osias believes she may be the first attorney - male or female - in the
country to do such advertising.").
2 SeeFrance, supra note 1,
at A1O.
3 See Blond Ambition: Leggy Lawyers Poses, Profits, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 12
[hereinafter Leggy Lawyers].
4 See Daniel Wise, Woman Lawyer's Suggestive Ads Stir Ire of Nassau
County Bar, N.Y.
L.J., Oct. 23, 1995, at 1.
5 France, supra note 1, at A1O. Interestingly, Osias claims that she has worn to
the office the leather shorts shown in her motorcycle ad. See Evelyn Nieves, Using
FeminineEdge to Open a Man's World, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 28, 1995, at B6.
6 France, supranote 1, atAl0.
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Bolstered by the success of her May ad, Osias ran a full-page ad
in the July issue of the New York Mortgage Press to lure additional
clients. The July advertisement, as one commentator described it, is
predominated by a photograph of Osias in which she was
draped across her desk, with a pencil suggestively held up to a
mouth that is slightly parted, as it would be in a Playboy
centerfold. Her long, blonde hair is draped over her shoulders,
and her legs are bent and crossed behind her to show off her
black, very high-heeled shoes. There is just enough cleavage
showing to suggest there is much more where that came from.'
The caption above the photograph this time reads, "DOES THIS
FIRM HAVE A REPUTATION?" with the answer below, 'YOU BET IT
DOES!!!""
Osias's desk has also seen other action. In another ad, Osias is
shown sprawled on her desk, wearing a miniskirt, with a caption
asking readers to "Try this nonconforming law firm." 9 In fact, since
1995, Osias has run several additional trade publication
advertisements featuring her scantily clad, in strikingly seductive
poses, and accompanied by still more captions containing sexual
double entendres.'0 In one such ad, as described in the New Jersey Law
Journal, Osias is "dressed in a miniskirt and spiked heels, one leg
propped up high by a stack of law books" with a caption declaring:
"Anywhere... Anytime... Anyhow ... Anybody... ANY POSITION
...We are Ready ... [in a smaller text font] to close your loan."'"
Another ad contains a caption reading: 'You could have me . . .
wherever you want me . . . whenever you want me . . . [again in a
smaller font] to close your loans."" Finally, in perhaps her most
scandalous advertisement of all, Osias is shown "wearing lingerie and
using a rope to round up men dressed in underwear."'
7 Jay M.Jaffe, Bold Ads Help Firms Position Themselves, NAT'L L.J.,

Mar. 18, 1996, at

B15.
Wise, supra note 4, at 1; France, supranote 1, atA10.
Legal Ethics and ProfessionalResponsibility: Advertising & Solicitation: County Bar
Won't File Grievance Against Mortgage Attorney Who Ran Provocative Ads, WEST'S LEGAL

NEWS, Nov. 2, 1995, available in 1995 WL 910971 [hereinafter LegalEthics].
10 Osias points out that she plans on running her sexy ads "forever." Her
ambition is to build her mortgage closing law firm into the largest in the country. See
Try This for Marketing Mortgage Services, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Oct. 23, 1995, at 78.
Inadmissible, 149 N.J. L.J. at 439 (Aug. 4, 1997), [hereinafter Inadmissible].
12 Id.
1S Tennen, supra note 1, at 8.
The underwear ad prompted the New York

Supreme Court's Grievance Committee for the Tenth Judicial District to send Osias a
letter in April 1996 objecting that the ad "casts the legal profession in a negative light
and invites both criticism and ridicule." Inadmissible, supra note 11, at 3.
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Not surprisingly, members of the bar lambasted Osias for
adopting a marketing strategy that, they claim, degrades the legal
profession. 4 The Nassau County Bar Association in New York even
What is
contemplated leveling disciplinary charges against her.
surprising, however, and even dumbfounding, in fact, is that the ads
have been outrageously effective. According to Osias, her practice
has enjoyed an 800% increase in business since she started running
her sexually tantalizing ads. 16 Although Osias once handled just a few
mortgage closings a week, her practice has swelled to more than fifty
a week, 7 and Osias has had to hire several additional associates to
handle the increased business." As of August 1997, Osias's solo
practice had burgeoned into a fifty-attorney practice spread over five
locations.' 9 One commentator remarked that Osias may have
"devised the most successful advertising campaign in the entire
history of the legal profession. '0 Perhaps the best proof of her
success is an ad from a competing male lawyer appearing in the New
York Mortgage Report, in which he poses topless behind a shower
curtain while attempting to conceal himself, with a caption reading:
committee claimed that the ad contains "extraneous content not designed to educate
legal consumers to an awareness of legal needs or to provide information relative to
the selection of appropriate counsel." Id. In July 1997, however, the grievance
committee dropped its objections. See id. Immediately afterward, Osias issued a
press release on the committee's decision, stating that her position was vindicated
and "[l]awyers can now use plenty of cleavage and leg in advertising their law firms
and their expertise." Greg Mitchell, Bar Says Lawyer Focuses on Wrong Kind of Appeal,
THE RECORDER,Aug. 4, 1997, at 4.
14 See Tennen, supra note 1, at 8 (noting attorneys' negative reaction
to Osias's
ads); Legal Ethics, supra note 9 (quoting the president of the Nassau County Bar
Association who considered the ads to be "unseemly"); France, supra note 1, at A10
(reporting that Osias received mail from some people calling her a "whore" and a
.prostitute," but also noting that "Osias clearly has won the hearts of the New Yorkarea mortgage lending community").
is The president of the Nassau County Bar Association, William F. Levine, called
Osias's ads "a disgrace that degrades the [legal] profession." Wise, supra note 4, at 1.
Levine further asked, "Would it be appropriate for her to present herself in the
nude? That's the next step, isn't it?" France, supra note 1, at A10. The Nassau
County Bar, however, ultimately decided not to bring a grievance complaint against
Osias, believing that it would be "fruitless." See No Bar to the Sexy Ads, DAiLY NEWS
(New York), Oct. 31, 1995, at 1. The bar was also concerned about bestowing further
publicity upon Osias. See France, supra note 1, at A10.
16 SeeTennen, supranote 1, at 8.
17 SeeFrance, supra note 1, at A10; Legal Ethics,
supra note 9.
18 See Wise, supra note 4, at 1.
In October 1995, the National Mortgage News
reported that Osias had hired seven new lawyers to meet increased demand for her
services. See Lawyer Raises Ire with "Suggestive" Marketing, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEws, Oct.

23, 1995, at 78. Ironically, all of the new lawyers were men. See id.
19 See Inadmissible, supra note
11, at 3.
20 France, supra note 1, atAl0.
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"I might not look as good in a bikini as other attorneys, but I do good
loans."21
One may understandably wonder what prompted Osias to
employ such sexually alluring advertisements to promote her real
estate and mortgage-finance practice in the first place. Her choice of
marketing strategy particularly is perplexing given that Osias, as a real
estate and mortgage-banking lawyer, handles work for sophisticated
clients who (presumably at least) would not be swayed, and, if
anything, would be off-put by sexually alluring advertisements.22 Yet,
ironically, the conservative nature of the real estate industry was
precisely what prompted Osias to resort to a sexually provocative
message to generate business. Osias claims that she devised her
advertising campaign as a means of breaking through the "glass
ceiling"23 of the "old boy's" network in the New York real estate
24
market, an industry she describes as "completely male-dominated.
Osias retells of how, after spending several years relying on traditional
networking strategies to generate business, including attending
meetings and other real estate functions, she met with little success
because, as she complains, the men form "cliques" and "they give
each other the business., 25 To compound matters, some networking
opportunities were not as available to Osias as they were to male
2 Tony Allen-Mills, Trading on Her Assets, SUNDAY TIMES
(New York), Mar. 10,
1996, at 1.
As one legal commentator explained: "For a corporate attorney, Ms. Osias has
adopted a marketing strategy that has been, to say the least, adventurous.
Conventional wisdom holds that business lawyers should surround themselves with
imagery that suggests tradition, permanence and caution: portraits of the robed
Lady Justice, say, or Greek Revival courthouses." France, supra note 1, at A10.
Nevertheless, as the commentator noted, it appears "that bankers and mortgage
brokers in the New York area may not be such a finicky group." Id. In any event,
Osias knows that "her intended audience, bank executives, already were very well
educated about legal services" and her ads are merely an attempt "to attract their
attention." Judson Hand, Sexually Suggestive Ads Worked for Woman Lawyer, ASBURY
PARK PRESS, Aug. 14, 1997, at A19.
23 See France, supra note 1, at A1O (noting that Osias "portrays her advertising
campaign as 'her way of punching through the glass ceiling"').
See Wise, supra note 4, at 1.
25 France, supra note 1, at A10 (reporting how Osias would attend real estate
functions and meetings in order to generate business, but that it was all unsuccessful
because, although she was familiar with members of the industry, she "didn't know
the right people"); As Osias later explained on Cable News Network, "I was trying to
represent banking institutions that are run by men and owned by men. I couldn't
get through the door. They wouldn't hear my knock and to get their attention, I
decided to attract what men like to look at and men like to look at beautiful, sexy
women." Lawyer Sells Sex Appeal (Cable News Network Financial television broadcast,
Dec. 23, 1997), available in WESTLAW, 1997 WL 2592047 [hereinafter Lawyer Sells
Sex].
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lawyers, such as golf outings, night club excursions, and even "tabledancing outings. ' 6 After years of frustration, and as a way to
penetrate the "male-dominated industry," Osias decided to rely on
her "assets as a woman and how I look to generate an interest and
make men stop and talk about me." 70 Osias is unabashed in her belief
that other women in the law also should use their "sexual weapons as
28
assets" to "manipulate men to advance in their careers.
Osias's sexy marketing strategy raises serious ethical questions
regarding the limits of attorney advertising. The immediate question
is whether Osias can be disciplined for her advertising campaign in
light of the constitutional limits placed on the ability of states to
regulate attorney marketing practices.0 In addition to the ethical
26 See Wise, supra note 4, at 1.

Indeed, the purpose behind Osias's May 1995
advertisement, which featured her in black leather pants, lying beside a hole on a
putting green, holding the head of a golf club, and accompanied by the caption, "We
Don't Play Golf ... We're Too Busy Closing Your Loans," was to counteract a lost
networking opportunity. France, supra note 1, at AIO. The real estate industry's
traditional golf tournaments are held in May, but Osias is not a golf enthusiast. See
id. Rather than lose a valuable networking opportunity available to the male lawyers,
Osias decided to go for the green by exploiting the golf theme of the men and
combining it with a slightly seductive, slightly sexual theme of her own. See id.
27 Wise, supra note 4, at 1. After she ran three or four
of her ads, Osias claims
that the "male bankers were falling over themselves to introduce themselves to her."
Sex No Object for Woman Lawyer; Provocative Ads Boosting Business, THE RECORD
(Hackensack, N.J.), Oct. 4, 1995, at A4. Osias is quick to point out, however, that to
retain the clients she has attracted, she still has to provide quality legal services. See
id. As Osias put it, "Maybe you can fool the consumer once, but you can't fool them
twice .... If you don't perform, your reputation goes down very quickly. If you're
good, word gets around." Hand, supra note 22, at A19.
28 Leggy Lawyers, supra note 3, at
12.
See Inadmissible, supra note 11, at 3 ("As a woman, you have to use your sexual
weapons as assets. That is what is going to set you apart."); see also License to Leer?
Lawyer Will Continue Racy Ads, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1997, at 14 (quoting Osias as saying, "I
think female attorneys should market themselves visually .... They're not going to

make money just being smart and having a J.D. in hand. It's OK as long as they
deliver serious and good legal work"); James Bernstein, Inside Stories: Lawyer's Upfront
Views Not Popular in Business, NEWSDAY, May 5, 1997, at C3 (quoting Osias's
observation that, "The whole world revolves around sex. Sex sells. It always has ....
It can be used, very effectively"); Allen-Mills, supra note 21, at 12 (quoting Osias as
stating that, "To those who say they won't use their sex to get ahead, I say 'Why not?
Why not?"'). Appearing on ABC's Good Morning America, Osias explained that
while "men ...control the world... [t]hey're vulnerable, they have a weakness. It's

their sexuality. Play to it, use it, manipulate it to your advantage. There's nothing
wrong with looking like a woman." Sexy Dressing at Work, on ABC GOOD MORNING
AMERICA (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 15, 1998), available in WESTLAW, 1998 WL
4726213.
so The Nassau County Bar's decision to abstain from pursuing disciplinary actions
against Osias highlights the difficulty of promoting standards in attorney advertising
practices. See supra note 13.
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considerations of her actions, however, Osias's ads also intensify the
debate over whether the practice of law is a time-honored, venerable
profession that demands certain professional conduct of its members,
or whether it is simply a commercial pursuit - a business that is
subject only to the constraints of business morality - or, perhaps,
whether the practice of law is both.
This Article analyzes the ethical propriety of using sex to attract
clients and explores the implications that such an advertising tactic
may have for the practice of law, particularly as it respects the public's
view of lawyers. Part I of the Article recounts the Supreme Court's
creation, and subsequent expansion, of attorney advertising rights as
part of its broader commercial speech jurisprudence. In light of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in F/orida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,
Part II analyzes whether the Court is signaling a new, more restrictive
approach toward attorney advertising rights. Part II also explores
whether Osias can be disciplined for employing sexual themes to
promote her law practice. Finally, Part III examines the central issue
raised by Osias's ads, namely, whether law is a profession, merely a
business, or a combination of both.
I. THE CREATION AND EXPANSION OF ATTORNEY ADVERTISING RIGHTS

Proscriptions against attorney advertising can be traced back to
Medieval English rules of professional etiquette, which, although
unwritten, were designed to protect the dignity of the legal
profession.32 The first statutory proscriptions, however, emerged in
1908, when the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted its Canons
of Professional Ethics."3 Canon 27 prohibited all forms of attorney
advertising, save for customary professional cards." The Model Code
of Professional Responsibility superseded the Canons in 1970. The
Model Code also provided for a blanket prohibition of attorney
advertising on the ground that such advertising would commercialize
the legal practice and undermine public confidence in the justice
system.35
One pertinent rule, Disciplinary Rule 2-101, banned
advertising in any "public communications" media.36
31 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
32

See HENRYS. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHIcs 23-24 (1953).

33 SeeJohn

Ratino, Note, In re R.MJ.: Reassessing the Extension of First Amendment
Protection to Attorney Advertising, 32 CATH.U. L. REv. 729, 732 n.27 (1983).
34 See A.B.A. CANONS OF PROFEssIONAL ETHICS Canon
27 (1908).
See MODEL CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONSIBILrIY EC 2-9 (1976) (amended

1980).

See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (1976).
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The blanket suppression of attorney advertising soon came
under attack by the Supreme Court. The traditional justifications
advanced by the bar, which were rooted in a desire to protect the
public from being misled," gave way to First Amendment
considerations. In the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court carved out a
sphere of constitutional protection for commercial speech beginning
with its landmark case of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council,39 the wellspring of the Court's modem
commercial speech jurisprudence.
In that case, consumers of
prescription drugs brought suit to challenge the constitutional
validity of a Virginia statute that deemed it unprofessional conduct
for a licensed pharmacist to advertise or promote the price of any
prescription drugs40 The Supreme Court expressly held, for the first
time, that speech that merely proposes a commercial transaction is
not so removed from any "exposition of ideas" and from "truth,
science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal
sentiments on the administration of Government," that it lacks all
constitutional protection.
In support of the advertising ban, the State of Virginia advanced
a series of justifications. As the Court observed, these State interests
were concerned principally with "maintaining a high degree of
professionalism on the part of licensed pharmacists., 42 The State
argued, for example, that aggressive price competition due to
limitless advertising would make it impossible for pharmacists to
37 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-9
(1976)

(amended

1980).

38 The First Amendment provides in relevant part that "Congress
shall make no

law ...

abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
U.S. 748, 761 (1976).
The Court's modern commercial speech
jurisprudence runs contrary to its earlier statements regarding First Amendment
protections for commercial speech. In Valentine v. Chrestensen, the Court proclaimed
that pure commercial advertising is not protected by the First Amendment. See 316
U.S. 52, 54 (1942) ("[T]he Constitution imposes... no restraint on government
[when it comes to] purely commercial advertising.").
40 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749-50.
The consumers sought to
enjoin the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, as well as its individual members, from
enforcing the statute, which provided, in part, that a licensed pharmacist in the state
of Virginia is guilty of unprofessional conduct if he "'publishes, advertises or
promotes, directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, any amount, price, fee,
premium, discount, rebate or credit terms ... for any drugs which may be dispensed
only by prescription."' Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (Michie 1974)).
Id. at 762 (citations omitted). Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, stated that simply because an advertiser's interest in a
commercial advertisement is a "purely economic one" does not disqualify him from
protection under the First Amendment. See id.
39 425

42

Id. at 766.
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provide professional services because of the resulting pressure to
economize services, which would, in turn, adversely affect consumers'
health. 43 The State also argued that advertising would tarnish the
professional image
of the pharmacist and reduce his status "to that of
44
a mere retailer.,

The Supreme Court, however, rejected the State's paternalistic
4 5
approach toward preserving professionalism among pharmacists.
Specifically, the Court found that the State's interest in protecting its
citizens rested "in large measure on the advantages of their being
kept in ignorance.4 6 Although the prohibition on advertising did not
affect professional standards "one way or the other," the Court found
that the prohibition did promote public ignorance and insulate the
pharmacist from price competition. Therefore, the prohibition
allowed the pharmacist to profit excessively, even while providing
inferior services.4 7
Rather than sanction the State's "highly
paternalistic approach," the Court found it more useful to assume
that the information contained in advertisements "is not in itself
harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they
are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to48
open the channels of communication rather than to close them."
While recognizing that the State has extremely wide latitude in
demanding that pharmacists fulfill certain professional standards, the
Court also made clear that a state may not suppress truthful drugprice information and thereby "[keep] the public in ignorance of the
entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists are offering."4 9
Thus, the Court declared the Virginia statute unconstitutional. 50
As a more general matter, the Court emphasized that, in a
largely free enterprise economy in which the allocation of resources
is made primarily through private economic decisions, "the free flow
of commercial information is indispensable."'" Consumer decisions,
See id. at 767-68. The State also claimed that advertising would not necessarily
lower the price of pharmaceutical drugs because the expense of advertising would
actually inflate the cost of drugs. See id. at 768.
44 Id. at 768. The State argued that by denigrating the
professional image of the
pharmacist, not only would there be a dearth of talented individuals attracted to the
profession, but the "better habits" of those within the profession would no longer be
reinforced. See id.
45 See id. at 769 (rejecting the State's "highly
paternalistic approach").
46 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy,
425 U.S. at 769.
4

47 See id.at 769-70.
48

Id. at 770.

49 Id.
50 See id. at 773.
51

Id. at 765.
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the Court explained, must "be intelligent and well informed," and
advertising, "however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem,"
contributes to the formation of those intelligent consumer decisions
affecting resource allocation.2
In fact, the Court noted that a
"consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information ...
.may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's
5 3
most urgent political debate.-

Although Virginia State Board of Pharmacy was pivotal in creating a
new sphere of First Amendment protection for commercial speech,
the Court did not afford such speech full constitutional protection,
and states retained significant authority to regulate fraudulent,
deceptive, or misleading advertisements. 54 Furthermore, the Court
specifically limited its holding to commercial advertising by
pharmacists because other professions, particularly the legal
profession, may involve distinctions, both historical and functional,
that invoke different considerations.55 Nevertheless, while limited in
scope, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy did contain the Court's
articulation of a new commercial speech jurisprudence under the
First Amendment, a significant announcement considering that the
Court had created a new species of free speech rights.
Although Virginia State Board of Pharmacy is the seminal case in
the sphere of constitutional protection for commercial speech
generally, the landmark case that extended limited First Amendment
protection to attorney advertising is Bates v. State Bar of Arizona. 6 In
Bates, two members of the Arizona Bar contravened the State's
disciplinary rules, which prohibited advertising in newspapers and
other media, when they advertised their fees for routine legal services

Virginia State Bd.of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
Id. at 763.
54 See id.
at 771-72. The First Amendment, the Court noted, does not prohibit
states "from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well
as freely." Id. at 772. Thus, false or misleading speech could be regulated. See id.at
771 ("Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its
own sake."). Following Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, states also retained the right
to impose time, place, and manner restrictions on commercial speech, provided that
52

53

the regulation (1) is content-neutral, (2) advances a significant governmental
interest, and (3) leaves open alternative channels for communication of information.

See id.
5 See id.
at 773 n.25. The Court noted that distinctions between the professions

.may require consideration of quite different factors." Id. Doctors and lawyers, for
example, "do not dispense standardized products; they render professional services
of almost infinite variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for
confusion and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds of advertising." Id.
433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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in a local newspaper. 7 The attorneys had turned to advertising after
they realized that their practice could not survive without public
awareness of the availability of their services and their low-cost fees.
The issue in Bates was whether a state may prohibit attorneys from
truthfully advertising the availability and terms of routine legal
services. 59 The Supreme Court, in sustaining the attorneys' First
Amendment challenge, rejected several justifications advanced by the
Arizona State Bar in support of its ban. The State had argued, first,
that advertising adversely affects professionalism because advertising
60
commercializes the legal profession and tarnishes its public image.
See id. at 354. The advertisement appeared in Phoenix's daily newspaper,
the
Arizona Republic. In the ad, the attorneys explain that they are offering "legal services
at very reasonable fees," and they list their fees for certain legal services. Id.
As the Court explained, the attorneys had just recently opened a law firm
with
the aim of providing low-cost legal services to persons of modest incomes. See id.
Given their low prices, however, the attorneys had a low rate of return for each case
handled, and consequently, in order to turn a profit, they depended on a relatively
high volume of clients. See id. After practicing for two years, the attorneys eventually
realized that if they did not advertise the availability of their services, including the
specific fees they charged, they would not generate the volume necessary for their
law firm to survive. See id. Thus, basic economic considerations were the primary
impetus behind the decision to advertise legal services. In fact, the Court even
speculated that the attorneys' law firm benefited from the advertising. See id. at 354
n.4. The precise value of the advertising, however, was uncertain because part of the
increase in business was due also to increased publicity surrounding the decision to
advertise. See id. As noted earlier, basic economic considerations were also the
impetus behind Osias's decision to employ her sexually appealing marketing
campaign. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text. As in Bates, however, it is
also unclear how much of the increase in Oasis's business should be attributed to the
increased publicity surrounding her decision to use sexual material to sell legal
services.
59 See Bates, 433 U.S. at 384. The attorneys
conceded that their advertisement
violated Disciplinary Rule 2-101(b), incorporated in Rule 29(a) of the Supreme
Court of Arizona. See id. at 355. The disciplinary rule provided in pertinent part:
"(b) A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or
any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through
newspaper or magazine advertisements,
radio or television
announcements, display advertisements in the city or telephone
directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he
authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf."
57

Id. at 355 (quoting

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

DR 2-101(b)

(1976)).
60 See id. at 368-72. As the Court recounted, several arguments
were marshaled to
support the State's claim that advertising would adversely affect the legal profession:
The key to professionalism, it is argued, is the sense of pride that
involvement in the discipline generates. It is claimed that price
advertising will bring about commercialization, which will undermine
the attorney's sense of dignity and self-worth. The hustle of the
marketplace will adversely affect the profession's service orientation,
and irreparably damage the delicate balance between the lawyer's need
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Although recognizing and commending "the spirit of public service
with which the profession of law is practiced and to which it is
dedicated," the Court rejected the State's first argument because it
"presumes that attorneys must conceal from themselves and from
their clients the real-life fact that lawyers earn their livelihood at the
bar., 6' The Court also challenged the State's empirical basis for its
argument on the grounds that it is not self-evident that advertising
diminishes an attorney's reputation within the community.62 Finally,
the Court questioned the historical justification for a ban on
advertising because the original prohibition grew up as a rule of
etiquette, not a rule of ethics.63 In any event, the Court observed that
today, "the belief that lawyers are somehow 'above' trade has become
an anachronism [and thus] the historical foundation for the
advertising restraint has crumbled."'
The Supreme Court, in Bates, summarily rejected several other
justifications proffered by the Arizona Bar, including claims that

to earn and his obligation selflessly to serve. Advertising is also said to
erode the client's trust in his attorney: Once the client perceives that
the lawyer is motivated by profit, his confidence that the attorney is
acting out of a commitment to the client's welfare is jeopardized. And
advertising is said to tarnish the dignified public image of the
profession.
Id. at 368. Despite the reference to a lawyer's "need to earn," the State's arguments
were grounded obviously on the supposition that the practice of law is indeed a
profession and not merely some commercial endeavor akin to encyclopedia
peddling. The public image of lawyers was a central concern of the State.
61 Id. at 368. The Court's rationale in Bates clearly reflects the commercial nature
of the attorney-client relationship. In fact, the Court also pointed out that the
American Bar Association (ABA) itself advises an attorney to reach "a clear
agreement with his client as to the basis of the fee charges to be made" and that this
is to be done "[a]s soon as feasible after a lawyer has been employed." MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-19 (1976). The Court found that the bar's own
canon cuts against the argument in support of a ban on price advertising. See Bates,
433 U.S. at 368. The Court remarked that "[i]f the commercial basis of the
relationship is to be promptly disclosed on ethical grounds, once the client is in the
office, it seems inconsistent to condemn the candid revelation of the same
information before he arrives at that office." Id. at 369.
62 See Bates, 433 U.S. at 369. To the contrary, the Court observed
that other
professions, including banking, engineering, and possibly even medicine, do not
regard advertising as inherently undignified. See id. at 370 & n.20. The Court
suggested that, if anything, public disillusionment with lawyers is directly attributable
to the absence of advertising in the legal profession. See id. at 370. The Court
observed that "cynicism with regard to the profession may be created by the fact that
it long has publicly eschewed advertising, while condoning the actions of the
attorney who structures his social or civic associations so as to provide contacts with
potential clients." Id. at 370-71.
6
CA

See id. at 371.

Id. at 371-72.
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attorney advertising is inherently misleading,6 that it adversely
touches upon the administration of justice,6 that it produces
undesirable economic effects, 67 that it affects quality of service,68 and9
that only a wholesale restriction could be effectively enforced.
Essentially, the Court rejected the paternalistic justification advanced
by the Bar that the public needs protection from unscrupulous
attorney practices. Rather, the Court determined that the public's
need for access to legal information outweighs any of the reasons for
suppressing attorney advertising. Indeed, in many ways, the Court's
Id. at 372-75. The State argued that attorney advertising is inherently
misleading because (1) legal services are "so individualized with regard to content
and quality" that informed comparisons are not possible in the context of an
advertisement, (2) consumers of legal services cannot determine beforehand
specifically what services they require, and (3) advertising is a medium that favors
and highlights irrelevant factors to the exclusion of other, more important,
information about the skills and quality of a particular attorney. Id. at 372. The
Court's rejection of the State's arguments is consistent with the antipaternalism
concerns of it earlier decisions, particularly Virginia State Board of Pharmacy. For
example, the Court in Bates agreed that advertising has the potential to highlight
irrelevant factors for consumers of legal services. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 372.
Nevertheless, the Court found it "peculiar to deny the consumer, on the ground that
the information is incomplete, at least some of the relevant information needed to
reach an informed decision." Id. at 374. In other words, as in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy, the Court's decision in Bates exhibits a trust in the ability of consumers to
evaluate information independently and to make informed decisions when selecting
legal services.
See Bates, 433 U.S. at 375-77. Specifically, the State argued that legal advertising
would stir up undesirable litigation. See id. at 375. The Court accepted that
advertising may increase litigation, yet at the same time could not accept the
proposition that "it is always better for a person to suffer a wrong silently than to
redress it by legal action." Id. at 376.
67 See id. at 377-78. The State argued that legal advertising would increase the
overhead costs of attorneys, who, in turn, would pass those costs on to legal
consumers in the form of higher legal fees. See id. at 377. The Court found this
argument "dubious at best" and actually suggested that "advertising will service to
reduce, not advance, the cost of legal services to the consumer." Id. The Court cited
evidence suggesting that price advertising may have the effect of dramatically
lowering prices. See id. at 377 n.35.
68 See id. at 378-79. Although the Court recognized the need for
quality legal
services, it held that prohibitions "are an ineffective way of deterring shoddy work."
Id. at 378.
See id. at 379. The State had argued that only a wholesale restriction on legal
advertising could be enforced. See id. In making this argument, the State noted that
the public lacks sophistication with respect to legal matters, and thus the public
would be highly susceptible to misleading or deceptive advertising. See id. The
Court, however, rejected this argument, finding it incongruous "to extol the virtues
and altruism of the legal profession at one point, and, at another, to assert that its
members will seize the opportunity to mislead and distort." Id. A wholesale ban on
advertising, therefore, was not justified simply because a few attorneys might
overreach the bounds of ethics in order to mislead the public. See id.
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bias against paternalism in Bates simply reflects its reasoning in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, in which the Court found that
consumers' right to receive pricing information on pharmaceutical
drugs overrides the State's interest in preserving the professionalism
of pharmacists.
As in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court's rhetoric in
Bates seems to reflect an inherent trust that the consumer will make
an informed choice when presented with commercial information.
The Court stated that assumptions about consumers' lack of
sophistication rest on an "underestimation of the public. ' , 71 In an
apparently conflicting statement later in its opinion, however, the
Bates Court noted that "the public lacks sophistication concerning
legal services. 72 Perhaps, then, for this reason, the Court emphasized
the narrowness of its holding.73 The Court did not imply that
attorney advertising may never be regulated. On the contrary,
pursuant to the Court's decision, states retained significant regulatory
authority to restrict false, deceptive, or misleading advertising.
Beyond that, however, the scope of permissible state regulation of
attorney advertising was left uncertain. In particular, the Bates Court
expressly declined to address certain issues, including claims about
the quality of legal services and in-person solicitation of clients. 75
70 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765-67.

See Bates, 433 U.S. at 375.
Id. at 383. In seeming opposition to its earlier observation, the Court stated
that "because the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services, misstatements
that might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other advertising may be found
quite inappropriate in legal advertising." Id.
See id. (emphasizing that the Court was not holding that attorneys could not be
regulated in any way).
See id. (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 & n.24). ThenJustice Rehnquist, however, completely disagreed with the majority's holding in Bates
regarding First Amendment issues. See id. at 404 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In a
sharp dissent, Justice Rehnquist wrote that the First Amendment's speech provision,
"long regarded by this Court as a sanctuary for expressions of public importance or
intellectual interest, is demeaned by invocation to protect advertisements of goods
and services."
Id. Justice Rehnquist adhered to his view that "appellants'
advertisement, however truthful or reasonable it may be, is not the sort of expression
that the Amendment was adopted to protect." Id.
75 See id. at 366. The former question, quality of legal services, was explored in In
re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982), while the latter question, in-person solicitation, was
addressed in Ohralik v. Ohio State BarAss'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). In the wake of Bates,
an ABA task force promulgated two proposed amendments to DR 2-101 of the Code
to bring ethical regulations governing lawyers in line with the Court's constitutional
standards. The first proposal, Proposal A, was a "regulatory" approach, also known as
the "laundry list" approach, that specifically provided a catalogue of information that
an attorney could permissibly place in an advertisement. See MODEL CODE OF
71

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (Proposal A Discussion Draft 1977).

Among
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The mid-1970s was the critical First Amendment wellspring for
both commercial speech in general and attorney advertising in
particular. Bates, of course, was only the beginning of this line of case
law. Within a year of Bates, the Court decided In re Primus,76 in which
the Court held that an attorney with the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), who had previously met with potentially aggrieved
individuals to advise them of their legal rights, could not be
disciplined for writing a subsequent follow-up letter to such
individuals informing them that the ACLU offered free legal
services.7
Subsequently, in 1980, the Supreme Court continued to refine
its new commercial speech jurisprudence in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,8 a nonlawyer advertising case

the designated items were name, field of practice, birth date, date of admission to
the bar, and so forth. See id. Conversely, Proposal B was a "directive" approach,
which only prohibited "false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive" advertising. See
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (Proposal B Discussion Draft

1977). While the meaning of these terms was not definitively set forth, Proposal B
did provide, for example, that an advertisement would be misleading if it appealed
"primarily to a layperson's fear, greed, desire for revenge, or similar emotion." Id.
As such, Proposal B was a more liberal approach to attorney advertising. In the end,
however, the ABA adopted Proposal A.
See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILrIY DR 2-101 (1983). Thus, Bates, as well as its progeny, brought
substantial changes to the bar's approach to its disciplinary rules.
76 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
77 See id at 414-17, 439. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, however, the
companion

case to Primus, the Court held that a state could constitutionally discipline an
attorney for in-person solicitation of clients for pecuniary gain, in this case, the inperson solicitation of accident victims. See 436 U.S. 447, 467 (1978). Although
stating that in-person solicitation serves a function similar to newspaper advertising,
the Court was able to distinguish this situation from Bates. See id. at 455. The Court
explained that, while in-person solicitation informs consumers about the availability
and terms of an attorney's proposed legal services, unlike newspaper advertising, it
"may exert pressure and often demands an immediate response, without providing
an opportunity for comparison or reflection." Id. at 457. Indeed, "the potential for
overreaching is significantly greater when a lawyer, a professional trained in the art
of persuasion, personally solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay
person." Id. at 465. In-person solicitation may actually disserve potential consumers
of legal services, thus running counter to the interest identified by the Court in Bates
of "facilitating 'informed and reliable decisionmaking."' Id. at 458 (quoting Bates,
433 U.S. at 364). Thus, the Court held that states have "a legitimate and indeed
'compelling' interest in preventing those aspects of solicitation that involve fraud,
undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of 'vexatious
conduct."' Id. at 462. The Court also recognized the states' broader responsibility to
maintain standards among members of licensed professions. See id. at 460. This is
especially true of lawyers who, while "self-employed businessmen," also act "as trusted
agents of their clients, and as assistants to the court in search of a just solution to
disputes." Id. (citing Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 124 (1961)).
8 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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in which the Court formulated a four-prong test for evaluating
governmental restrictions on commercial speech:
(1) The speech must not be misleading and it must concern
lawful activity;
(2) the asserted state interest promoted by the restriction must be
substantial;
(3) the restriction must directly advance the asserted state
interest; and
(4) the restriction must not be more extensive than necessary to
serve the asserted state interest. 9
A few years later, in In re R.M.J, 8 0 the Court had its first

opportunity to apply the Central Hudson test in the attorneyadvertising context. The Committee on Professional Ethics and
Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Missouri, as did many states
in response to Bates, amended its attorney-advertising regulations to
permit limited lawyer advertising to satisfy constitutional standards
under the First Amendment."' The Missouri rule, however, was still
restrictive in that it only permitted lawyer advertising in three limited
print forums: newspapers, periodicals, and the yellow pages of
telephone directories.8 2 Moreover, advertising was restricted to
certain categories of information and, possibly, certain specified
language .8

In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Powell, the Supreme
Court applied the Central Hudson test and ruled that the Missouri
advertising restrictions, as applied to the attorney's advertisements in

See id. at 566. Later, in Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox,
the Court modified the fourth prong of the CentralHudson v. Public Service Commission
test to require only a "reasonable fit" between the asserted state interest and the
restriction on commercial speech, rather than the least restrictive means available.
See 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989). This, in effect, adopted an intermediate scrutiny
standard for evaluating commercial speech regulations.
80
455 U.S. 191 (1982).
79

s1 See id. at 193.
82

3

See id.at 194 (citing Mo.REv. STAT., Sup. Ct.Rule 4,DR 2-101(B) (1978)).
See id. (citing M o.
REv.
STAT., Sup. Ct. Rule 4, DR 2-101(B) (1978)). The

categories of information to which advertising was limited included: "name; address
and telephone number; areas of practice; date and place of birth; schools attended;
foreign language ability; office hours; fee for initial consultation; availability of a
schedule of fees; credit arrangements; and the fixed fee to be charged for certain
specified 'routine' legal services." Id. In addition, if a lawyer intended to list his
areas of practice in an advertisement, he was required to use either general
descriptive terms (specified in the Missouri rule), such as "General Civil Practice" or
"General Criminal Practice," or choose from a list of twenty-three areas of practice
provided, such as 'Tort Law" or "Family Law." See id.
at 194-95.
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this case, were unconstitutional." Justice Powell explained that
Missouri had failed to show that the attorney's listing of practice areas
was in any way misleading and had also failed to identify any
substantial governmental interest justifying the restriction upon
attorney speech.85 While states may prohibit misleading advertising
altogether, the Court found no evidence in the record demonstrating
that Missouri's absolute ban on advertising was necessary to protect
against potentially misleading information, such as listing legal
practice areas, when such information can be presented in a
nondeceptive manner. 816
The Court, however, did find "[s] omewhat more troubling" that
portion of the attorney's advertisements that indicated, in large
capital letters, that he was a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court
of the United States. 17 As Justice Powell stated, such a statement
potentially could mislead members of the general public who are
unfamiliar with the requirements for admission to the Supreme
Court.88
At the very least, "[t]he emphasis of this relatively
uninformative fact is ...in bad taste." 9 Nevertheless, the Court
sustained the attorney's argument because there was no evidence in
the record demonstrating that such information actually was
misleading.9 Thus, despite some concern over potentially distasteful
attorney advertisements, the Court's In re RM.J decision further
expanded the scope of First Amendment rights for attorneys.
Just three years after In re R.M.J, the Court again examined, and
again expanded, attorney advertising rights. In Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinay Counsel,9' the Court addressed whether a state could
84 See id. at 205.
The attorney's advertisements appeared in several local
newspapers and in the yellow pages of the local telephone directory. See id. at 196.
The advertisements included information concerning the states in which the
attorney was licensed to practice. See id. at 197. The advertisements also contained a
statement, presented in large capital letters, that the attorney was "Admitted to
Practice Before THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT." Id. In addition, the
attorney's advertisements listed practice areas in a manner that was in contravention
of Missouri's restrictions on lawyer advertising.
See id. For example, the
advertisements included language such as "personal injury" and "real estate" rather
than "tort law" or "property law." See id. Finally, as the Court observed, the
attorney's advertisements failed to include a disclaimer of certification of expertise
that was required after the list of practice areas. See id.
85
86
87
88
89

90
91

See id. at 205.
See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at
203.
See id. at 205.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 205-06.
471 U.S. 626 (1985).
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discipline attorneys for running a newspaper advertisement featuring
nondeceptive illustrations and legal advice. In that case, an Ohio
attorney ran a small ad in a Columbus newspaper offering legal
representation to defendants in drunk-driving cases, as well as the
return of "legal fees" if the client was convicted.
To attract
additional clients a year later, the attorney placed advertisements in
several Ohio newspapers containing a line-drawing of the Dalkon
Shield and offering legal services to women injured as a result of
using the birth control device.94
The Ohio Office of Disciplinary Counsel brought charges
against the attorney alleging that his drunk-driving ad was false and
misleading because it offered representation to criminal defendants
on a contingent-fee basis - a violation of Ohio disciplinary rules.95
The complaint also alleged that the Dalkon Shield ads violated
several Ohio disciplinary rules, including (1) the rule prohibiting the
use of illustrations in attorney advertisements,
requiring
advertisements to present information in a "dignified manner," and
limiting the information permissible in an advertisement to twenty
enumerated items;96 (2) the rule against self-recommendation; 97 and
(3) the rule against accepting employment resulting from unsolicited
legal advice.98 The Dalkon Shield ads also were alleged to be
See id. at 629. The Court also addressed the question of whether a state
may
require attorneys to disclose in their advertisements certain information regarding
fee arrangements in order to prevent potential deception of the public. See id.
93 See id. at 629-30.

See id. at 631. As the Court noted, the attorney's ambitious advertisement did
its job: it attracted numerous clients. See id. The attorney received over 200
inquiries because of the advertisements, and over 100 of those inquiries resulted in
lawsuits on behalf of injured women. See id. Of course, the advertisements also
attracted the attention of the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, which brought
disciplinary action against the attorney. See id.
See id. Specifically, the complaint alleged that because the attorney's
ad
offered representation to criminal defendants on a contingent fee basis, an offer that
is prohibited by Disciplinary Rule 2-106(C) of the Ohio Code of Professional
Responsibility, it therefore violated DR 2-101(A) as "false, fraudulent, misleading,
and deceptive to the public." Id.
See id. at 632 (noting that complaint alleged a violation of Ohio Disciplinary
Rule 2-101 (B)).
97 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 633. Specifically, the complaint charged
the attorney
with violating DR 2-103(A), which prohibited an attorney from "recommend[ing]
employment, as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a nonlawy'er who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer." Id.
See ii at 633. The attorney was charged with violating DR 2-104(A), which
prohibited "[a] lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should
obtain counsel or take legal action [from] accept[ing] employment resulting from
that advice." Id.
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deceptive for failing to inform clients that they still could be liable for
"costs," as opposed to "legal fees.""
Applying the Central Hudson test, the Court first addressed
whether the attorney could be disciplined for contravening Ohio's
rules against self-recommendation and solicitation. The Court noted
that, because the Office of Disciplinary Counsel had stipulated that
information about the Dalkon Shield contained in the advertisement
was neither false nor misleading, Ohio's power to prohibit inherently
misleading attorney advertisements did not extend to this case.10'
Given the accuracy of the attorney's advertisement, the Court held
that Ohio could not demonstrate that its prohibition directly
advanced a substantial governmental interest."" The Court rejected
the State's argument that its restrictions on attorney advertising
advanced the same governmental interests that were found sufficient
to uphold the prophylactic rule on in-person solicitation by lawyers in
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n.'0 2 Unlike the practice of in-person
solicitation for pecuniary gain, which the Court in Ohralik found to
be "a practice rife with possibilities for overreaching, invasion of
privacy, the exercise of undue influence, and outright fraud,' '03 the
Court explained that print advertising poses much less of a risk of
overreaching because it generally "lack[s] the coercive force of the
personal presence of a trained advocate.' 0 ° Although the Court
admitted that "some sensitive souls may have found [the attorney's
advertising] in poor taste," that fact was not sufficient
to implicate the
05
concerns motivating the Court's decision in Ohralik
See id. Importantly, however, the complaint never alleged that the Dalkon
Shield drawing itself was false or misleading. In fact, the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel stipulated that the drawing was an accurate representation of the birth
control device. See id. at 634.
100 See id. at 639-40 (noting that the attorney's advertisement merely "reported the
indisputable fact that the Dalkon Shield has spawned an impressive number of
lawsuits and advised readers that [the attorney] was currently handling such lawsuits
and was willing to represent other women asserting such claims").
10 See id. at 641.
1o2 See id. (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978)).
103 Zauderer,471 U.S. at 641 (citing Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464-65).
104 Id. at 642.
Indeed, the Court observed that "a printed advertisement is a
means of conveying information about legal services that is more conducive to
reflection and the exercise of choice on the part of the consumer than is personal
solicitation by an attorney." Id.
105 Id. The Court also rejected "the traditional justification for restraints
on
solicitation, the fear that lawyers will 'stir up litigation,"' as sufficient to impose
discipline on the attorney in this case. Id. The State further argued that a
prophylactic rule against legal advice and information in attorney advertisements was
necessary given the "regulatory difficulties" associated with such advertising. See id. at
643. The Court, however, argued that such a prophylactic rule is not narrowly
99
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The Court similarly rejected Ohio's justification for prohibiting
the use of illustrations and pictures in attorney advertising. 0 6 It was
unclear to the Court how application of this rule to attorney
advertising directly advanced the State's interest in preserving the
dignity of attorneys given the absence of any claim that the Dalkon
Shield advertisements were somehow undignified. 107 Although
acknowledging that the State possesses significant regulatory
authority to ensure that dignity and decorum are preserved among
attorneys in the courtroom, the Court expressly questioned whether
the State's interest in ensuring that attorneys maintain dignity in
their communications with the public is substantial
enough to justify
01 8
curtailing attorneys' First Amendment rights.
Ohio argued that its restrictions on illustrations were necessary
because "[a] buses associated with the visual content of advertising are
particularly difficult to police, because the advertiser is skilled in
subtle uses of illustrations to play on the emotions of his audience
and convey false impressions. "' The Court rejected, however, the
State's arguments as completely unproven." If anything, the Court
crafted to serve the State's purpose, as required by Central Hudson. See id. at 644.
The Court noted that a state may not absolutely prohibit certain attorney
advertisements simply because they have the potential to be misleading. See id.
Justice O'Connor, however, dissented from the Court's holding, which struck
down Ohio's rule against accepting employment resulting from unsolicited legal
advice. See id. at 673-80 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For Justice O'Connor, Ohio's
rule was justified due to the risk of overreaching and undue influence from the use
of unsolicited legal advice to attract clients. See id. at 673. Justice O'Connor noted
that professional services are "complex and diverse" and that, prior to hiring an
attorney, members of the general public often lack the information needed to assess
the quality of legal services. See id. at 674. Moreover, the Justice opined, attorneys
themselves are not disinterested and may often attempt to present information in an
incomplete or prejudiced fashion. See id.
106 See id. at 647.
107 See id. ("There is, of course, no suggestion that
the illustration actually used by
appellant was undignified.").
08 See id. at 647-48. At the very least, a prophylactic rule could not be justified in
the absence of any evidence showing that undignified behavior was prevalent among
attorneys in their communications with the public. See id. at 648. The Court added
that "the mere possibility that some members of the population might find
advertising embarrassing or offensive cannot justify suppressing it." Id. Moreover,
the Court concluded, "The same must hold true for advertising that some members
of the bar might find beneath their dignity." Id.
Io9
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 648. The State added that because "illustrations may
produce their effects by operating on a subconscious level .... it will be difficult for
the State to point to any particular illustration and prove that it is misleading or
manipulative." Id. Thus, the State claimed that a prophylactic rule was necessary to
advance the State's interest in ensuring that the public was not misled, manipulated,
or confused. See id.
10 See id. ("[N]owhere does the State cite any evidence or authority of any kind
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suggested, illustrations in attorney advertisements are less likely to
lead to deception or misrepresentation than are illustrations in other
types of advertisements given that "decisions regarding consumption
of legal services are [rarely] based on a consumer's assumptions
'
about qualities of the product that can be represented visually."' 1
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that Ohio could not discipline
the attorney2 for his accurate and nondeceptive Dalkon Shield
illustration.

Notably, the Court's Zaudererdecision drew an important dissent
by Justice O'Connor, who staunchly maintained that "state regulation
of professional advice in advertisements is qualitatively different from
regulation of claims concerning commercial goods and merchandise,
and is entitled to greater deference than the majority's analysis would
permit.""' Tojustice O'Connor, because there was a clear difference
between lawyers, who provide professional services to individual
clients, and commercial vendors, who simply supply standardized
consumer products to the general public, states could14
"understandably require more" of the former than the latter.
Justice O'Connor noted that "[t]he legal profession has in the past
been distinguished and well served by a code of ethics which imposes
certain standards beyond those prevailing in the marketplace and by
' 5
a duty to place professional responsibility above pecuniary gain.""
Although acknowledging the view of some that professionalism has
been abandoned in the practice of law, Justice O'Connor
nevertheless maintained that states could demonstrate a substantial

for its contention that the potential abuses associated with the use of illustrations in
attorneys' advertising cannot be combated by any means short of a blanket ban.").
I"'Id. at 649.

See id. The Court, however, did uphold Ohio's rule requiring attorneys who
advertise their services on a contingent fee basis to disclose in their ads that clients
at
may still be liable for costs even if their lawsuits are ultimately unsuccessful. See id.
652. The attorney's advertisement in Zauderer informed potential clients that they
would not be liable for legal fees if their cases were not successful. See id. The ad,
however, did not distinguish between "legal fees" and "costs." See id. The Court
found this problematic because the public is generally unaware of the distinction
between "legal fees" and "costs," and consumers reading the attorney's advertisement
might believe that if they employed the attorney they would not incur any charges
whatsoever, which, of course, is not entirely true. See id. Given the potential for
deception from such incomplete advertising, the Court upheld Ohio's requirement
that attorneys must disclose information regarding a client's responsibility for costs.
See id. at 653.
11 Id. at 676 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
14 See id. (noting that "[l]awyers are professionals, and
as such they have greater
obli
rOtions").
12

nZauderer, 471 U.S. at 677 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
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governmental interest in preserving stringent disciplinary rules with
respect to attorneys." 6 Despite Justice O'Connor's dissent, however,
the majority significantly expanded attorney advertising rights in
Zauderer, an expansion that afforded little weight to Justice
O'Connor's concerns about maintaining professionalism in the legal
profession.
Just three years after Zauderer, the Supreme Court once again
broadened attorney solicitation rights, and once again Justice
O'Connor dissented. In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n,"7 the Court
held that states could not categorically prohibit lawyers from sending,
for pecuniary gain, direct-mail solicitations to potential clients facing
particular legal problems when the targeted letters were neither false
nor deceptive." 8 The Court distinguished this case from Ohralik by
rejecting the suggestion that targeted, direct-mail solicitations pose
the same risk of overreaching and undue influence as does in-person
solicitation by lawyers." 9 Rather, the Court found targeted letters
more analogous to print advertisements that easily can be ignored,
discarded, or considered at a later time. 20
The Court found,
therefore, that a complete ban on targeted, direct-mail solicitations
could not be justified, despite the fact that less restrictive means 2 of
regulation afforded greater opportunity for abuse by some lawyers.1 '
id.
486 U.S. 466 (1988).

116 See
117

11 See id. at 479-80.
Shapero involved a Kentucky attorney who applied to the
Kentucky Attorneys Advertising Commission for approval of a letter he wanted to
send to persons against whom a foreclosure suit had been filed. See id. at 469. The
letter warned potential clients that, because they could lose their homes, they should
call the attorney for help against creditors. See id. The attorney added in the letter
that "[i]t may surprise you what I may be able to do for you. Just call and tell me that
you got this letter." Id. The Kentucky Attorneys Advertising Commission, however,
refused to approve the letter. See id. Although it did not find the letter false or
misleading, the Commission denied approval because the letter ran afoul of the
then-existing Kentucky Supreme Court Rule prohibiting the mailing of written
advertisements "'precipitated by a specific event or occurrence involving or relating
to the addressee or addressees as distinct from the general public."' Id. at 469-70
(quoting KY. Sup. C-r. R. 3.135(5)(b)(i)).
119 See id. at 475 (stating that the "suggestion that this case is merely
'Ohralik in
writing' misses the mark").
The Court, however, did express greater hesitancy
toward letters that are personalized to particular individuals, as opposed to those that
are merely targeted. See id. at 476. The Court stated that personalized letters
"present[ ] an increased risk of deception .... [and] could, in certain circumstances,
lead the recipient to overestimate the lawyer's familiarity with the case or could
implicitly suggest that the recipient's legal problem is more dire than it really is." Id.
20 See id.at 475-76.
121 See id. at 476. The Court also rejected the argument that the
attorney's letter
was overreaching and thus not protected by the First Amendment. See id. at 478.
The Court observed that the attorney's letter contained certain devices to attract the
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Justice O'Connor again dissented in Shapero, but this time in an
even more assertive fashion.1 22 The Justice severely criticized the
Court's attorney-advertising jurisprudence, claiming that it rested on
the defective analogy that professional legal services are no different
from standardized consumer products. 23 Justice O'Connor observed
that, in soliciting potential clients, an attorneys' professional
judgment is prone to corruption if the attorney is motivated by
pecuniary gain.2 4 And yet, for Justice O'Connor, a distinguishing
feature of membership in the legal "profession" is the "ethical
obligation to temper one's selfish pursuit of economic success by
adhering to standards of conduct that could not be2 5enforced either
by legal fiat or through the discipline of the market.'
Justice O'Connor explained that restrictions on advertising and
solicitation serve as daily reminders to practicing attorneys that they
should not treat their membership in the legal profession as merely
some "trade or occupation like any other.'' 2 6 For Justice O'Connor,
highly stringent disciplinary rules on attorney advertising "can
continue to play an important role in preserving the legal profession
as a genuine profession.' 2 7 The Justice's dissent closed in prophetic
fashion, predicting that time would most likely reveal the folly of a
constitutional theory that is wholly insensitive
to the concerns of
28
professionalism among members of the bar.
Justice O'Connor's prediction was realized in 1995, at least
partially, when, in F/orida Bar v. Went ForIt, Inc.,' the Supreme Court
reader, including the "liberal use of underscored, uppercase letters" and the
inclusion of subjective assertions. Id. Obviously, the Court noted, "The pitch or style
of a letter's type and its inclusion of subjective predictions of client satisfaction might
catch the recipient's attention more than would a bland statement of purely
objective facts in small type." Id. at 479. The Court concluded, however, that the
attorney's letter was truthful and nondeceptive, and thus the State could claim no
substantial interest in prohibiting such solicitations outright. See id.
12
See id. at 480-91 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
1
See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 487 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The roots of error in
our attorney advertising cases are a defective analogy between professional services
and standardized consumer products and a correspondingly inappropriate
skepticism about the States' justifications for their regulations.").
. See id. at 486 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
15 Id. at 488-89 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting). AsJustice
O'Connor explained, "Both
the special privileges incident to membership in the profession and the advantages
those privileges give in the necessary task of earning a living are means to a goal that
transcends the accumulation of wealth. That goal is public service ...."Id at 489
(O'Connor, J, dissenting).
126Id.at 490 (O'ConnorJ,dissenting).
27 Id. at 491 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
128

See id.

129 515

U.S. 618 (1995).
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upheld a thirty-day ban on direct-mail solicitations during which,
following an accident, attorneys could not solicit personal injury and
wrongful death clients!" ° Florida had amended its lawyer advertising
rules in late 1990 to institute the thirty-day ban based on the
completion of a two-year study by the Florida Bar showing the effects
of attorney advertising on public opinion."' A Florida attorney and
his lawyer referral service, Went For It, Inc., intended to send
targeted solicitations to accident victims or their survivors within
thirty days of an accident and thus challenge Florida's regulation
under the First Amendment.
Justice O'Connor, this time writing for a majority of the Court,
Florida argued
upheld under Central Hudson the thirty-day ban.
that it had a substantial interest in protecting the public against
"intrusive" direct-mail solicitations, which disrupt "the privacy and
tranquility" of accident victims during sensitive periods and
commensurately tarnish the reputation of the legal profession as a
whole.'" The thirty-day ban was, therefore, an attempt "to protect the
flagging reputation of Florida lawyers by preventing them from
engaging in conduct that . . . 'is universally regarded as deplorable
and beneath common decency because of its intrusion upon the
special vulnerability and private grief of victims or their families.'13
Justice O'Connor had "little trouble crediting the Bar"s interest as
substantial" 35 because the Court previously had identified the States'
interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility of citizens as
interest in regulating the practice of
substantial and the States'
3 6
professions as compelling.
130

See id. at 635.
See id. at 620.

As the Court noted, the two-year study was extensive and
included hearings, surveys, and reviews of public commentary. See id.
131

1

"

See id. at 623-35.
See id. at 624-25.

Id. at 625.
Went For It, 515 U.S. at 625. As Justice O'Connor noted later in her opinion,
"The Bar has substantial interest both in protecting injured Floridians from invasive
conduct by lawyers and in preventing the erosion of confidence in the profession
that such repeated invasions have engendered." Id. at 635.
1 See id. at 625. Justice O'Connor cited Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,in which the
Court recognized that "States have a compelling interest in the practice of
professions within their boundaries, and... as part of their power to protect the
public health, safety, and other valid interests they have broad power to establish
standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions." 421
U.S. 773, 792 (1975). Justice O'Connor also quoted the well-accepted proposition
from Edenfield v. Fane that "'the protection of potential clients' privacy is a substantial
state interest.'" See Went For t 515 U.S. at 625 (quoting Edenfeld v. Fane, 507 U.S.
761, 769 (1993)).
'3
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The Court further concluded that the thirty-day ban also directly
and materially advanced the State's interests, thus satisfying the next
prong of the Central Hudson test."'7 Justice O'Connor distinguished
Edenfield v. Fane,ss in which the Court struck down under the First
Amendment a Florida prohibition on in-person solicitation by
certified public accountants (CPAs)-9 Unlike Edenfield, in which the
State had offered no evidence that in-person solicitation by CPAs
posed a threat of fraud or overreaching, Florida, in this case, had
submitted a two-year, 106-page study substantiating its claims that
direct-mail solicitations by lawyers immediately following accidents
intrudes on potential clients' privacy and tarnishes the image of the
legal profession.'4"
Indeed, a critical component of Florida's
successful defense of its thirty-day ban, as divined from Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion, was the evidence assembled by the
State specifically demonstrating actual harm stemming from directmail solicitations of accident victims.' Unlike the rule in Edenfield,
157

See Went For It, 515 U.S. at 626. Justice O'Connor emphasized that "'mere

speculation or conjecture"' cannot satisfy the state's burden of showing that its
regulation advances its interest in a direct and material way. See id. (quoting
Edenfield 507 U.S. at 770). Rather, the state must actively "demonstrate that the
harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
de ree." Id.
507 U.S. 761 (1993).
139 See id.
at 777.
140 See Went For It, 515 U.S. at 626-28. As Justice
O'Connor noted, Florida's study
contained both statistical and anecdotal evidence. See id. at 626. On the statistical
side, the State produced a random survey of Florida adults, which revealed that
Floridians as a whole have negative feelings toward attorneys who employ direct-mail
advertising to solicit clients. See id. at 626-27. The survey indicated that more than
half of the general population considered it a violation of their privacy for attorneys
to contact individuals concerning accidents. See id. at 627. Specifically, Justice
O'Connor found it "significant" that 27% of individuals who had actually received
direct-mail advertising from lawyers in the past "reported that their regard for the
legal profession and for the judicial process as a whole was 'lower' as a result of
receiving the direct mail." Id. at 627.
The State also produced voluminous anecdotal evidence demonstrating that
many Floridians were highly critical of direct-mail soliciting by attorneys in the wake
of accidents. See id. The study even included excerpts of complaints from individuals
who had received direct-mail solicitations from lawyers. See id. Justice O'Connor
noted that one recipient reported "how he was 'appalled and angered by the brazen
attempt' of a law firm to solicit him by letter shortly after he was injured and his
fianc6e was killed in an auto accident." Id. (quoting summary of record of Florida
study). Another recipient found it "despicable" and "inexcusable" that a Pensacola
lawyer wrote to the recipient's mother three days after his father's funeral. See id.
See id. at 628-29. Justice O'Connor further noted that the court of appeals'
reliance upon Shapero to invalidate the Florida thirty-day ban was erroneous for
several reasons, including the fact that the State in Shapero had not advanced any
evidence justifying its regulation. See id. at 629. Unlike the present case, the Court
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this restriction was specifically aimed at "a concrete, nonspeculative
harm.' 42 As Justice O'Connor explained, the Florida Bar was not
targeting offensive direct-mail advertisements in the abstract, 4 ' but
rather, was "concerned... with the demonstrable detrimental effects
that [sending offensive direct-mail solicitations
just days following an
44
accident] has on the profession it regulates.'
Finally, Justice O'Connor found that Florida had chosen
reasonable means to advance its governmental interests, thus
satisfying the final prong of the Central Hudson test.'4 5 The Justice
explained that the thirty-day ban left several alternative channels
available to attorneys for communicating with the public.' 46 As a
result, the Court upheld Florida's thirty-day, direct-mail solicitation
ban.
Court observers have predicted that Went For It heralds a major
change in the Court's approach toward attorney advertising. 147 In
explained, Shapero did not deal with a state regulation defended on privacy grounds,
nor did it deal with a blanket prohibition on direct-mail solicitations. See id.
Moreover, "the State in Shapero assembled no evidence attempting to demonstrate
any actual harm caused by targeted direct mail." Id. Rather, the State in Shapero
attempted to justify its regulation "on the basis of blanket, untested assertions of
undue influence and overreaching." Id. Justice O'Connor found "the Court's
perfunctory treatment of privacy in Shapero to be of little utility in assessing
[Florida's] ban on targeted solicitation of victims in the immediate aftermath of
accidents ....[because it] targets a different kind of intrusion." Id. at 630.
142 Id. at
629.
143 For example, Justice O'Connor distinguished
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983), in which the Court struck down the federal
government's attempt to ban potentially offensive direct-mail advertisements for
contraceptives. See Went For It, 515 U.S. at 631. The Court in Bolger stated that
citizens whose sensibilities might be offended by contraceptive advertisements could
simply avert their eyes and throw such mail into the trash, thus avoiding any injury
arising from the delivery of such advertisements. See id. (citing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 72).
In contrast, the Justice opined, the harm flowing from the receipt of a direct-mail
solicitation immediately following an accident cannot be minimized simply by
throwing the letter away. See id. Justice O'Connor rejected Bolger as a basis "for
dismissing the [Florida] Bar's assertions of harm, particularly given the unrefuted
enirical and anecdotal basis for the Bar's conclusions." Id. at 631-32.
1 Went ForIt, 515 U.S. at 631. As the State articulated, the main purpose behind
the thirty-day ban was to protect Floridians against "crass commercial intrusion by
attorneys upon their personal grief in times of trauma." Id. at 630.
145 See id. at 632.
The Central Hudson test, as amended by Board of Trustees of The
State University of New York v. Fox, only requires a "reasonable" fit between the state's
interest and the means chosen to advance its interest, rather than a perfect fit as
required by the "least restrictive means" test. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
1

See Went ForIt, 515 U.S. at 634.

See, e.g., Jodi Vanderwater, Note, Florida Bar v. Went For It: Restricting
Attorney
Advertising to Preserve the Image of the Legal Profession, 27 LoY. U. CHI. LJ. 765, 799
(1996) (noting that Went For It "marks the beginning of a new era for attorney
147
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fact, some commentators claim that the decision "revive[s] the idea,
largely dormant since Bates, that the image of the legal profession can
justify regulation of lawyer advertising."'" At the very least, some
suggest, the decision will embolden states to strengthen their
attorney-advertising regulations, very likely doing so in the name of
image.' 49 As the next section of this Article suggests, however, the
significance of Went For It may be highly exaggerated. If anything,
Went For It is a very narrow holding that does not afford states the
power to discipline lawyers, such as Osias, on the basis that their
marketing schemes threaten to tarnish the image of the legal
profession.
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF WENTFORIT. SOUNDING THE HORN OF
RETREAT FROM CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF ATTORNEY
ADVERTISING?

In the months immediately following Went For It, several Court
watchers worried that the decision marked the beginning of the end °
for meaningful constitutional protection of attorney advertising.15
The zeitgeist regarding Went ForIt was, and still seems to be, that Went
For It stands for the proposition that states may restrict attorney
advertising to protect the integrity and reputation of the legal

advertising").
14
Elizabeth D. Whitaker & David S. Coale, Professional Image and Lawyer
Advertising, 28 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 801, 827 (1997).
1
See Vanderwater, supra note 147, at 799 (maintaining that "the decision will
likely encourage states to clamp down on attorney advertising in the name of
image"); Richard P. Martel, Jr., Comment, Regulation of Advertising in the Legal
Profession - Still Hazy After All These Years, 1997 DET. C.L. REv. 123, 158 (noting
prediction of others that Went For It will "encourage the states to toughen their
regulations on attorney advertising").
Such dire predictions surfaced in both the popular legal press, see, e.g., Richard
C. Reuben, Florida Bar's Ad Restriction Constitutional, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 20
(observing that, while some in the legal community view the decision as narrow,
many others fear that it will provide justification for greater restrictions on attorney
advertising generally), and in the law reviews, see, e.g., Jonathan M. Remshak, Survey,
6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 453, 461 (1995) (stating that Went For It "represents a
retreat from a twenty-year-long expansion of First Amendment protection for
commercial speech ....[and] opens the door for the creation of greater restrictions
on how, when, and to whom commercial speech may be directed"); Christina Derry,
Recent Decision, 69 TEMP L. REv. 523, 545 (1996) (concluding that "Went For It
represents a step backward, and could establish a trend toward a more conservative
and paternalistic view of First Amendment protections"); Daniel Zelenko, Note, Do
You Need a Lawyer? You May Have to Wait 30 Days: The Supreme Court Went Too Far in
Florida Bar v. Went For It, 45 Am.U. L. REv. 1215, 1218 (1996) (arguing that Went
For It "has reduced the amount of First Amendment protection available to attorneys
by giving states more ability to regulate commercial ...speech").
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profession, a notion that, according to prevailing wisdom,'51 the Court
laid to rest in Zauderer.'51 Indeed, one prominent First Amendment
attorney, Felix Kent,' divined from the decision "that a majority of
the Justices have turned away from the previous, more liberal
interpretations of the First Amendment as applied to commercial
speech in general and lawyer advertising in particular.', 5 4 Kent,
echoing the prevailing wisdom, predicted that, "based on the
reasoning of the majority in [Went For It], a restriction on lawyer
advertising may well be upheld in the future if the restriction will
enhance the reputation of the profession." 5 5 For Kent and other
Supreme Court watchers, Went ForIt spelled the end of Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona.
Judging from the treatment that Went For It has received in the
lower courts, however, the reports of Bates's death have been greatly
exaggerated.
If Went For It sounded the horn of retreat from
constitutional protection of attorney advertising, the lower courts
apparently have not heard it. Courts have cited and relied upon the
case in seventy-two published opinions since it was decided. 56 Only a
handful -

seventeen -

of these decisions actually involve attorney

advertising. 57 Of those seventeen, the courts primarily have relied on
Professor Ronald Rotunda has voiced this opinion. According to him, Went For
It marks "the first time that the Court has upheld advertising restrictions based on
the need to protect the dignity of lawyers." Ronald D. Rotunda, Professionalism,Legal
Advertising, and Free Speech in the Wake of Florida Bar v. Went For It, 49 ARK. L. REv.
703, 704 (1997). Professor Rotunda further noted that "the Court in the past has
specifically rejected this purported justification." Id.
152 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 648 (1985)
(expressing disapproval of the idea that promotion of the legal profession's
reputation could be considered a substantial state interest); see also supra notes 91-116
and accompanying text (discussing whether Zauderer was overruled sub silentio by
1

Went ForIt).
155 Kent's writings frequently appear in the New York Law Journaland
often focus
on the Supreme Court's recent commercial speech decisions. See, e.g., Felix A. Kent,
FirstAmendment and Commercial Speech in 1998, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 18, 1998, at 3 (discussing
absence of commercial speech decisions during the 1998 term); Felix A. Kent,
Compelled Contributions to Commercial Speech, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 15, 1997, at 3 (discussing
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997)) ; Felix A. Kent, A
Significant First Amendment Decision, N.Y. L.J., June 21, 1996, at 3 (discussing 44
Liouormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996)).
Felix A. Kent, Advertising in a Post-Bates' World: High Court More Conservative,
N.Y. L.J.,June 30, 1997, at S2.
155

Id.

Shepard's result obtained on Westlaw. The case has been cited in forty-one
federal court opinions and in twenty-nine state court opinions. This figure was
accurate at the time this Article was drafted.
157 Several federal cases involve attorney advertising. See Falanga
v. State Bar of
Georgia, 150 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 1998) (discussed infra); Ficker v. Curran, 119 F.3d
156
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Went For It for nothing more significant than as a citation in support
of the recitation of the Central Hudson test."' With one or two
exceptions, discussed below, 9 the lower courts have not explained or
discussed the case in any detail. Indeed, it is somewhat ironic that a
decision, which has been decried for establishing a double standard
1150 (4th Cir. 1997); McDevitt v. Disciplinary Bd., 1997 WL 88154, at *2 (10th Cir.
Mar. 3, 1997) (citing Went For It in setting forth the Central Hudson test); Revo v.
Disciplinary Bd., 106 F.3d 929, 933 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that the Court, in Went
For It, found maintenance of the public's respect for the legal system to be a
substantial state interest); Bell v. Legal Advert. Comm., 998 F. Supp. 1231, 1238
(D.N.M. 1998) (relying on Went ForIt for the proposition that "courts have tended to
require evidence supporting an assertion that a particular type of advertising is
inherently misleading or otherwise deserving of being banned"); Sterns v. Lundberg,
922 F. Supp. 164, 167 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (including Went ForIt in string cite, as "cf" for
proposition that "[f]ederal courts are in universal agreement that the regulation of
lawyers' conduct is a fundamentally important state interest"); cf. Silverman v.
Walkup, 21 F. Supp.2d 775, 779 (E.D. Tenn. 1998) (citing Went For It in support of
the proposition that "the State's interest in establishing standards for licensing and
regulating professional practitioners of chiropracticmedicine in such a way as to protect
the reputation of the profession is substantial") (emphasis added).
Several state cases also involve attorney advertising. See In re Lassen, 672 A.2d
988, 998 (Del. 1996) (relying on Went For It for the proposition that "[t]he United
States Supreme Court has recently recognized that preservation of the integrity of
the bar and maintenance of the public's perception of the bar are valid objectives of
state regulation of attorneys"); In re Robbins, 469 S.E.2d 191, 193 (Ga. 1996)
(upholding limitations on advertising as "specialist," and citing Went For It for the
sole proposition that attorney advertising is a form of commercial speech); Board of
Prof'l Ethics and Conduct v. Kirlin, 570 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Iowa 1997) (reprimanding
attorney for violating state ethics rules, and citing Went For It only for purposes of
setting forth CentralHudson test); Board of Prof'l Ethics and Conduct v. Wherry, 569
N.W.2d 822, 825 (Iowa 1997) (upholding constitutionality of restriction on attorney
advertising of specialties, and citing Went For It only for the purpose of setting forth
Central Hudson test); In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct Against 97-29, 581
N.W.2d 347, 351 (Minn. 1998) (upholding constitutionality of rule prohibiting inperson or telephone solicitation of clients under Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n and
federal appeals court decision, and relying on Went For It only for recitation of the
CentralHudson test); In re Ravich, Koster, Tobin, Oleckna, Reitman & Greenstein, 155
N.J. 357, 367, 715 A.2d 216, 220-21 (1998) (relying on Went For It in upholding
constitutionality of the New Jersey disciplinary rule, which is similar to Florida's,
prohibiting solicitation of accident victims and families); Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v.
Leigh, 914 P.2d 661, 666 (Okla. 1996) (suspending attorney and citing Went ForIt for
purposes of setting forth the Central Hudson test); Comm'n For Lawyer Discipline v.
Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 433 (Tex. 1998) (relied upon Went For It, without
discussion, in upholding constitutionality of a Texas rule prohibiting post-verdict
communication with jurors); In re Pavilack, 488 S.E.2d 309, 310 (S.C. 1997)
(reprimanding attorney who ran ad which, the court found, was misleading, and
citing Went For It only in passing in setting forth Central Hudson test); Lawyer
Disciplinary Bd. v. Allen, 479 S.E.2d 317, 325 (W.V. 1997) (upholding
constitutionality of law prohibiting telephone solicitation, but citing Went ForIt only
forgurposes of setting forth the Central Hudson test).
See cases collected in supra note 157.
See infra notes 161-78 and accompanying text.
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of commercial speech - one for advertising by "businesses" and
another for advertising by "professionals" - is relied upon for the
most part in run-of-the-mill "business" commercial speech cases.' 160
The lower court treatment of the case suggests both that Went For
It has been interpreted narrowly and that the lower courts are
unwilling to extend it beyond the solicitation context. Indeed,
although a few cases have invoked the decision to uphold solicitation
bars similar to Florida's, 61 the decision has yet to be invoked in any
meaningful way as direct support for other types of attorneyadvertising restrictions.
Even within the solicitation context,
moreover, one federal court of appeals has refused to apply Went For
It, and declined to read the case as standing for the proposition that
states may prohibit attorney advertising solely as a means of
promoting or maintaining a positive view of the legal profession.
In Ficker v. Curran6'the Fourth Circuit found unconstitutional a
Maryland restriction, passed shortly after the Went For It decision, that
prohibited an attorney from mailing targeted solicitation to arrestees
and their relatives within thirty days of an accident, disaster, criminal
charge, or traffic charge.'63 A criminal defense attorney and the
owner of a direct-mail company that provides direct-mail services to
attorneys challenged the restriction.
The State defended the law's
constitutionality under Went ForIt.
160

In fact, Went ForIt has been relied upon in contexts ranging from a New York

State Liquor Authority's attempt to prevent a brewer from using labels that depicted
a frog giving "the finger," see Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Auth.,
134 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 1998), to the prohibition of the sale of guns at a county
fairgrounds. SeeNordyke v. Santa Clara County, 110 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1997).
See, e.g., Falanga, 150 F.3d at 1347 (upholding Georgia's broad ban on inperson solicitation); In re Ravich, Koster, Tobin, Oleckna, Reitman & Greenstein, 715
A.2d at 221 (upholding New Jersey ban similar to Florida's); In re Charges of
Unprofessional Conduct, 581 N.W.2d at 351 (upholding ban on in-person or
telephone solicitation). Indeed, Falanga and other cases prohibiting in-person or
telephone restrictions are not really applications of Went For It, but, rather,
applications of the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Ohralik, which approved of
restrictions on in-person solicitation. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447, 467 (1978).
162 119 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir.
1997).
1
See id. at 1151 (noting that the law was passed in the 1996 session
of the
Maryland General Assembly); see also Alan Cooper, Soliciting by Mail Approved: The 4th
Circuit Nixes a Ban in Criminal and Traffic Cases, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 11, 1997, at A7
("Following the U.S. Supreme Court's 1995 ruling in [Went ForIt].... the Maryland
Leslature adopted a... rule [similar to Florida's].").
See Ficker, 119 F.3d at 1151.
The Fourth Circuit stated that "Ficker is a
Maryland
attorney
who
represents
traffic
defendants
facing
possible
incarceration .... [and] has traditionally obtained clients by mailing letters to
individuals who have been issued traffic citations." Id. The circuit court then stated
that "Boehm [the other plaintiff] owns and manages LETS Company, which
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The Fourth Circuit, in disagreeing with the State's arguments in
support of the regulation, catalogued a litany of factors that
distinguished the case from the situation the Supreme Court
confronted in Went For It. The court of appeals first distinguished
Went For It by noting that the interests served by the Florida ban
differed substantially from those served by the Maryland ban. The
interests served by the Florida ban were protecting "the privacy of
accident victims and wrongful death clients" and providing them
"with a period to cope with their grief before being asked to redress
an emotional loss."'16 By contrast, the court explained, "[w]hile a
criminal or traffic defendant may be shaken by his arrest, what he
needs is representation, not time to grieve." 66 Second, the court
noted that, "while accident victims typically have three years... to file
a claim, criminal defendants are subject to a much more accelerated
calendar."1 67 Consequently, the court explained, "[t]he relative
urgency of the defendant's need for legal representation finds no
parallel in the civil plaintiff."' 6 8 Third, the court opined, "[u]nlike an
accident victim, who can choose to avoid public scrutiny of his private
affairs by not filing a suit or by settling quietly, the criminal arrestee is
in the legal system involuntarily and has already had his privacy
compromised before a solicitation letter is ever sent."O Finally,
observed the court, a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment
right to counse1 70 Thus, "the effect of the law, if not its intent, is to
make it more71 difficult for our opponents to get legal
representation."1
The Fourth Circuit had cogent reasons to distinguish Went For It
in the Ficker decision based upon the facts, i.e., the differences
between civil litigants and criminal defendants. The court of appeals,
however, went further. The court rejected the notion that Went ForIt
established that the dignity of the legal profession can be a
substantial state interest. The court also appeared to reject the
notion that Went ForIt opened the door to the use of opinion polls as

produces and mails attorney advertising letters to individual Maryland [residents]
with criminal offenses orjailable traffic offenses." Id.
165 Id. at 1155 (citing Went ForI4 515 U.S. at 629-32).
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 1155-56.
169 Id. at 1156.
170 See Ficker, 119 F.3d at 1156 (stating that, "unlike a civil litigant, the criminal or
incarcerable traffic defendant enjoys a Sixth Amendment right to counsel").
1
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
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a means of determining whether an interest is appropriately
considered substantial.
To support its asserted interest in protecting the reputation of
the legal profession, the State attempted to use a study purporting to
show that "'many' traffic offenders thought targeted direct mail
violated their privacy.""i As an initial matter, the Ficker court
observed that a different study, which used a larger sample
population and had a smaller margin for error, "show[ed] that a
majority of North Carolinians would not object to receiving attorney
letters after getting a traffic ticket, and would actually like to receive
such letters" in some instances.'" The court stated that it refused to
"resolve this battle of studies."1 4 Even more significantly, the court
remarked that it would not "credit or discredit state interests based
on the shifting sands of polling data, which change according to
techniques, sample populations, and even the phrasing of the
questions.""'
Finally, the Fourth Circuit flatly rejected the notion that the
letters would cause reputational harm to the legal profession or that
such harm was a proper concern for the State in the absence of some
other asserted interest. According to the court, in Went For It, the
timing of the letters caused disrespect for the legal profession, and,
thus, the timing of the letters was viewed as the target of the law.
Drawing the contrast, the court noted that, in the case of Maryland's
prohibition on solicitation, timing was not an issue."76 Consequently,
the court concluded, the real targets of the Maryland law were the
letters themselves. 77 On this point, the Fourth Circuit echoed the
172

Id. at 1154.

17

Id.

174

Id.
Id. To avoid the appearance of a conflict with Went For It, the Fourth Circuit

175

asserted that the majority in Went For It "used [polling] data only as confirmation of
the fact that the regulation targeted a 'concrete, nonspeculative harm,'" not as a
basis for the decision itself. Id. at 1154 n.2 (quoting Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,
515 U.S. 618, 629 (1995). According to the court of appeals, "If the Court had rested
its decision on the polling data, presumably it would have undertaken some
evaluation of the reliability of the data, which it declined to do." Id. The Fourth
Circuit also injected a bit of common sense into its rejection of the State's polling
data: "It is hardly clear ... that where criminal and traffic defendants, in need of
timely legal advice and representation, receive just such information in the mail, they
will hold the legal profession in low esteem." Id. at 1154.
176 See Ficker, 119 F.3d at 1154 (stating that "any negative attitude toward
the legal
profession that a criminal defendant might have after receiving unwanted mail on
day one or twenty-one will not dissipate by day thirty-one").
7
See id. ("Any disrespect to the legal profession engendered by targeted directmail solicitation would not be caused by the timing of the targeted letters, as was the
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sentiments of the dissenters in Went For It "The fact that protected
speech might prove offensive to some people has never justified its
suppression for all people, and the Supreme Court forbids us from
banning speech merely because some subset of the public or the bar
finds it embarrassing, offensive, or undignified." 178
It is too early to tell whether Ficke's refusal to extend Went For It
outside of its immediate factual context is likely to become the
exception or the rule.'79
Ficker, however, provides the most
judicial
treatment
of Went ForIt to date and is the first
comprehensive
case to confront the issue of whether protecting the dignity of the
legal profession alone may be considered a substantial state interest.
As such, Ficker is likely to carry a great deal of influence for those
courts, both federal and state, confronted with an attempt to restrict
attorney advertising on the basis of protecting the dignity of the legal
profession.
The empirical evidence (i.e., the lower court treatment of Went
For It) suggests that Went ForIt is limited to its particular facts. But it
is still early. Thus, the question becomes whether the decision
reasonably can be interpreted as authorizing broader bans on
attorney advertising. Does Went For It signal the reduction, if not
elimination, of meaningful protection for attorney advertising?
Under Went For It, could Osias be disciplined for her risqu6
advertisements? A careful reading of Went For It reveals that attorney
advertising in general, and Osias's advertisements in particular, retain
the same constitutional protection now as they did before the
decision.
On their face, New York's disciplinary rules seem to prohibit
precisely the type of advertisements Osias used. The disciplinary
rules applicable to advertising and solicitation provide as follows:
(a) A lawyer on behalf of himself or herself or partners or
associates, shall not use or disseminate or participate in the
case in [ Went ForIt], but a general distaste for such solicitation.").
178 Id. at 1154; see also Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 648.
l7 Without engaging in a careful analysis of Ficker, courts in at least three cases,

two of which preceded Ficker, have read Went ForIt as approving of the notion that
protection of a profession's reputation is a substantial state interest. See Revo v.
Disciplinary Bd., 106 F.3d 929, 933 (10th Cir. 1997) ("The Board asserts that it has a
substantial interest in maintaining the public's respect for the legal system - respect
which may be eroded by personal injury solicitation letters. The Supreme Court
found this interest substantial in Went For It."); Silverman v. Walkup, 21 F. Supp.2d.
775, 779 (E.D. Tenn. 1998) (reading Went For It as holding that the state has a
substantial interest in protecting the reputation of the chiropractic profession); In re
Lassen, 672 A.2d 988, 998 (Del. 1996) (interpreting Went For It as recognizing a

substantial state interest in the protection of the integrity of the bar).

SEX IN LEGAL ADVERTISING

1999]

preparation or dissemination of any public communication
containing statements or claims that are false, deceptive,
misleading, or cast reflection on the legal profession as a whole.
(b) Advertising or other publicity by lawyers, including
participation in public functions, shall not contain puffery,
self-laudation, claims regarding the quality of the lawyer's
leal services, or claims that cannot be measured or verified..
On their face, both sections (a) and (b) appear to bar Osias's
ads.
Section (b), in fact, seems geared toward precisely the
exaggerated, self-laudatory captions that accompany Osias's ads. 81 In
addition, section (b)'s prohibition of "statements or claims... that
cast reflection on the legal profession as 182a whole" would seem to
encompass the sexually suggestive pictures.
The question, however, is whether disciplinary action pursuant
to these rules is constitutionally permissible. For those who interpret
Went For It broadly, the answer is likely to be yes because, for them,
Went For It stands for the proposition that a state may prohibit
advertising that casts the legal profession in a bad light. For those
who have a more restrained view of the decision, however, the answer
must be no.
As suggested above,' the restrained interpretation of Went ForIt
seems to be winning out in the lower courts. Judging from the
proposed changes to New York's disciplinary rules, the restrained
interpretation also is winning out in the legislatures and bar
associations. Telling in this regard are the most recent proposals of
the New York Special Committee to Review the New York Lawyer's
Code of Professional Responsibility. The proposals would change

ISON.Y. CoMP.

CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.6 (1998) (emphasis added).
supra note 11, at 3 ("We will ride anything... to get to your

181 See Inadmissible,

closing on time," "We don't play golf ...
"Anywhere ... Anytime ...

we're too busy closing your loans,"

Anyhow... Anybody.. . Any position...

We are Ready.

• . to close your loan."); see also supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text (describing
the various captions used by Osias in her ads). While her editorial comments easily
constitute "puffery" as well, the same could be said for the pictures themselves, given
Osias's poses and attire.
182 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.6(b) (1998). This, however, is less
than clear. Section (a), after all, is directed at "statements or claims," not pictures.
Depicting lawyers as "sexy" is not necessarily bad for the reputation of lawyers as a
whole. Indeed, many would say that it would improve the public perception of
attorneys.
183 See supra notes 150-61 and accompanying text (discussing
Ficker and the fact
that lower courts have been conservative in their interpretations and applications of
Went ForIt).
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disciplinary rules of New York.'" In 1996, after Went For It was
debated in the legal community, the Special Committee
recommended removing section (b) in its entirety and deleting the
phrase "cast reflection on the legal profession as a whole" from the
disciplinary rules.85 The Committee recommended deletion of the
"casts reflection" language on the grounds that it "is vague and likely
186
to be unenforceable under established Supreme Court precedents."
The proposed removal of this language puzzled the editors of the
New York Law JournaOn the one hand, we agree with the proposition that the deleted
language is vague and therefore objectionable. On the other
hand, the committee is probably wrong in its perception of the
Supreme Court's view of the state of the law on this subject. In its
most recent decision on the topic.... the Supreme Court upheld
a Florida rule prohibiting targeted, direct mail advertising to
accident victims within 30 days of the accident, in the process
expressly adopting the argument that damage to the reputation of
the
the profession was a valid consideration in evaluating
87
propriety of a state's regulation of lawyer advertising.
The Committee also proposed eliminating section (b) in its entirety
and rephrasing it to prohibit puffery and self-laudation only if the
advertisements are "false, deceptive, or misleading." The reason,
explained the Committee, is that the present formulation is too vague
to survive a constitutional challenge.'88 Thus, if Went For It spelled the
end for Bates, the Special Committee was oblivious. Therefore, with a
few scattered exceptions, the courts, legislatures, and bar associations
have refused to read Went For It broadly. There are several potential
explanations for this reluctance.
First, in light of Zauderer, it is difficult to read Went For It as
approving "dignity of the profession" as a substantial state interest. In
Zauderer, the Court appeared to disapprove of the notion that the
public's perception of lawyers could ever be a "substantial
government interest":
[A]lthough the State undoubtedly has a substantial interest in
ensuring that its attorneys behave with dignity and decorum in

the courtroom, we are unsure that the State's desire that attorneys
maintain their dignity in their communications with the public is
184

The rules were last amended in 1993.

Anthony E. Davis, Proposed Changes to the New York Lawyers' Code - Part II, N.Y.
L.J.,July 1, 1996, at 3.
1m Id.
187 Id.
188 See id.
18
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an interest substantial enough to justify the abridgment of their
First Amendment rights ....
[T]he mere possibility that some
members of the population might find advertising embarrassing
or offensive cannot justify suppressing it. The same must hold
true for advertising that some members of the bar might find
beneath their dignity./s9
If Went For It holds, as a general matter, that maintenance of the
dignity of the legal profession is a substantial interest, then the Court
must have overruled Zauderer sub silentio. But the Went For It majority
expressly relied on Zaudererin reaching its decision.' 9 Consequently,
the argument continues, Went For It cannot reasonably be read as
having approved of the idea that maintaining the dignity of the
profession is a substantial state interest, and those who read Went For
It in this way are reading it too broadly. This argument has some
force, but, ultimately, fails to persuade.
Zauderer does not hold that protecting or promoting the dignity
of the legal profession is not a substantial state interest; the Court in
Zauderersuggests that it is unlikely to consider such an interest substantial.9'
The Court's discussion of the point is mere dicta.8 9 (Accordingly, it is
not necessary to read Went For It as implicitly overruling Zauderer to
conclude that it approves of the promotion, maintenance, and
93
dignity of the legal profession as a substantial state interest.)
Other reasons,
however,
militate
against
the
broad
interpretation of Went For It.
First, although not necessarily
inconsistent with Zauderer,such an interpretation may be inconsistent
with some of the Supreme Court's other commercial speech cases. 9 '
199
190

191

Zaudrer,471 U.S. at 648.
Went For t, 515 U.S. at 638.

See id.

Indeed, the resolution of this issue was not essential to the Court's resolution
of the case. As the Court noted, while the purpose of the disciplinary rule under
which Zauderer was punished was to "ensure that attorneys advertise 'in a dignified
manner,' ...... [t]here [was] ... no suggestion that the illustration actually used...
was undignified; thus, it is difficult to see how the application of the rule to appellant
in this case directly advances the State's interest in preserving the dignity of
attorneys." Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647. The remainder of the Court's analysis
concerned the State's asserted interest in preventing the public from being misled
and manipulated.
1
The dissenters in Went For It characterized Zaudevr's statements regarding
whether the dignity of the profession is a substantial interest as a "holding." See Went
For It, 515 U.S. at 638 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that, "in Zauderer... where
we struck down a ban on attorney advertising, we held that .... ) (emphasis added).
194 See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977)
(invalidating a
New York statute banning the advertising and display of contraceptives). Of course,
Carey involved commercial speech of a "business" nature (and implicated other
interests the Court had deemed important as well), not of a "professional" nature.
192
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More importantly, despite the apparent unanimity among Court
observers that Went ForIt elevates the dignity of the legal profession to
the level of "substantial interest," it is not at all clear that the majority
ever actually does so. To be sure, Justice O'Connor rather loosely
bandies about the notion that the integrity of the legal profession is
the aim that the Florida restriction ultimately seeks to promote and
protect. 95 Moreover, at the conclusion of her opinion for the
majority, the Justice seems to treat the privacy interest and
professionalism interests as separate and distinct.'9 6 In the course of
her analysis, however, Justice O'Connor does not treat them as
separate interests, regardless of any contrary intention. In other
words, Justice O'Connor does not treat the interests asserted by the
State as an either/or proposition, and
her analysis depends on the
97
presence of both asserted interests.
Indeed, Justice O'Connor uses the presence of the asserted
interest of privacy to distinguish the Supreme Court's previous cases,
such as Shapero.'9 Furthermore, the Justice seems to reject the idea
that the public's disapproval of lawyers' advertising as an abstract
matter would be enough to justify a regulation:
"While it is
undoubtedly true that many people find the image of lawyers sifting
through accident and police reports in pursuit of prospective clients
unpalatable and invasive, this case targets a different kind of
intrusion." 9 ' Although Justice O'Connor might like to elevate the
promotion and maintenance of professionalism for its own sake as a
substantial state interest, the Justice did not go that far in Went For It.
As the Justice's language suggests, Justice O'Connor actually rejected
such a notion. Under Went For It, the Court apparently will deem
professionalism a substantial state interest only if it serves some other
state interest, such as the protection of privacy. Alternatively, a
Consequently, if Went For It was Justice O'Connor's attempt to bifurcate commercial
speech into two categories, with separate standards for "mere" businesses and for
professionals (principally attorneys), then Carey easily could be distinguished.
195 See Went ForIt, 515
U.S. at 625-33.
196 See id. at 634-35 ("The Bar has substantial
interest both in protecting injured
Floridians from invasive conduct by lawyers and in preventing the erosion of
confidence in the profession that such repeated invasions have engendered.").
197 See John J. Watkins, Lawyer Advertising, the Electronic Media,
and the First
Amendment, 49 ARx. L. REv. 739, 771 (1997) ("The Court directly linked [the State's
interest in privacy] with the State's asserted interest in maintaining the dignity of the
legal profession .... Given this linkage, it has been argued that [Went For It]
probably does not signal 'any major rethinking of lawyer advertising.'")
"9 See Went For It, 515 U.S. at 629 ("Contrary to the dissent's
suggestions.., the
State in Shapero did not seek to justify its regulation as a measure undertaken to
prevent lawyers' invasions of privacy interests.").
199 Id. at 630 (distinguishing
Shapero).
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regulation that promotes professionalism as a consequence of serving
some other goal would survive constitutional scrutiny.
Went ForIt, however, provides neither express nor tacit approval
of the idea that professionalism can be enforced for its own sake in
the context of attorney advertising. That omission leaves open the
question of whether professionalism should be promoted for its own
sake and whether it even makes sense to do so. As the next section
explores, there are normative reasons why the emphasis on
professionalism should be relaxed. In fact, as the debate concerning
whether the law is a profession or a business reveals, professionalism
has been increasingly on the wane among lawyers for the last several
decades.
III. PROFIT VERSUS PRINCIPLE: THE DEBATE CONCERNING THE LAW AS
A BUSINESS ORA PROFESSION

Osias's provocative marketing campaign promises only to
heighten the already contentious debate over whether the practice of
law is a profession or a business. Although the debate has been
simmering since the turn of the twentieth century, it boiled over
when the Supreme Court decided Bates v. State Bar of Arizona. By
countenancing competitive practices such as lawyer advertising, Bates
and its progeny legitimized commercialism within the law and
allowed it to burgeon over the last several decades under the aegis of
constitutionalism.
Lawyers are increasingly embracing the
commercial side of the law, often to the exclusion of their
professional responsibilities, and Osias's unconventional ads are no
exception. In fact, Osias's ads represent, at the present time, the
most extreme commercial example of the rejection of professional
values concerning the portrayal of lawyers. The very notion that the
law is a noble profession, detached from business, could be at stake
today, thus making the profession-versus-business debate more
relevant than ever.
In framing the profession-versus-business debate, it is useful to
organize the competing sides according to contrasting paradigms.
This Article employs the terms "profession paradigm" and "business
paradigm" to identify the competing camps in the debate.2
The
profession paradigm, which is the traditional paradigm, postulates a

For an application of a theory of paradigms to legal professionalism, see
generally Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shifp: Why Discarding
ProfessionalIdeology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv.

1229 (1995).
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dichotomy between a business and a profession."' The profession
paradigm exalts the practice of law as a higher calling, a noble
profession, devoted to public service, and thus distinguishes it from a
mere trade or occupation. Members of the profession, in turn, are
expected to maintain themselves with dignity by observing a special
code of conduct that includes suppressing the commercial aspects of
the practice in order to uphold and preserve the paradigm's values.
The business paradigm, by contrast, repudiates the businessprofession dichotomy and assigns no particular value to the standards
of conduct deemed essential under the profession paradigm. Rather,
conduct under the business paradigm is governed by the morality of
the marketplace, and while the practice of law still is regarded as a
worthy endeavor, it is no different from any other occupation. In
fact, the pursuit of profit through commercialism itself defines the
essence of lawyering under the business paradigm.
This section traces the rise and decline of the profession
paradigm and then explores how the ascendancy of the business
paradigm in the last several decades has provoked a professionalism
crisis within the law.
This section catalogues the arguments
supporting each side and then explores how Osias's marketing
strategy, in particular, informs the profession-versus-business debate.
Finally, this section analyzes whether the rise of the business
paradigm, and the converse decline of the profession paradigm, will
ultimately prove detrimental to American law.
A. The Profession Paradigmin American Law
The profession paradigm, as a clearly identifiable ideology, arose
in the late nineteenth century as a reaction to the widespread
perception that the legal profession was degenerating into a
business.2 02
Leaders of the bar grew concerned
that
commercialization would seriously erode the business-profession
dichotomy and allow the practice of law to degenerate into a "mere"
occupation2 3 Pressures of commercialization had begun to grow in
20

See id. at 1230.

See id. at 1241. During the late nineteenth century, there was an "extraordinary
outpouring of rhetoric, from all the public pulpits of the ideal - bar association and
law school commencement addresses, memorial speeches on colleagues, articles and
books - on the theme of the profession's 'decline from a profession to a business.'"
Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies and Practicesof New
York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIEsTS: LAWYERS IN PosT-CvIL WAR
AMERICA 51, 61 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984).
See Pearce, supra note 200, at 1238. The profession paradigm was a "response
to rising concerns that entrepreneurial aspects of law were undermining the
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the mid-nineteenth century because the bar "was essentially open,"
and the ranks of lawyers swelled immenselym The huge influx of
attorneys, in turn, forced some legal practitioners actively to pursue
clients to maintain a livelihood.205 Bar elites perceived the increasing
competition among lawyers as a threat to professionalism." Thus,
under the banner of preserving the cherished tradition of the law as a
higher calling, distinct from a business, entrepreneurial activities
such as advertising and solicitations of clients were proscribed. 2°'
With the rise of the profession paradigm, however, came the
difficulty of defining "profession" in the first place, a difficulty that
exists even today. Clearly, the term "evokes favorable emotions and
suggests status. "2 Unfortunately, scholars do not uniformly agree on
whether the term "profession" is even susceptible to a static or
uniform definition."9 Quite a few legal commentators engaging in
profession's reputation." Id. at 1231.
See Mylene Brooks, Lawyer Advertising: Is There Really a Problem, 15 LOY. LA.
ENT. L.J. 1, 6 (1994).
205 See id. at 6-7. By contrast, lawyers in England were few
in number. See id. at 5.
English lawyers also did not suffer from pressures to actively pursue clients. See id.
The practice of law in England was "distinguishable from craft and trade associations
by parameters of society, wealth, and education." Id. Its members were born of
affluence - "generally men from leading families who trained in the classics rather
than in elaborate apprenticeship programs." Id. As such, they "had little regard for
the competition and caveat emptor of the crafts because they were not completely
dependent upon their professions for their livelihood." Id. In addition, that there
were relatively few lawyers in the practice ensured a "readily available business,"
further negating the need to actively pursue clients. See id. In fact, English lawyers
eschewed commercialism; the practice of law was regarded as a public service, not a
business, and thus lawyers abstained from competing for clients altogether for fear of
being branded "tradesmen." See id. ("Afraid of being referred to as tradesmen,
lawyers refused to compete for clients for fear of ruining their intimacy amongst
their colleagues.").
2W As one commentator has observed:
During the latter part of the nineteenth century, leaders of the bar,
who were predominantly business lawyers, attempted to stop
commercialism in the as yet unregulated legal profession. To achieve
this end, the leaders of the bar sought to reestablish standards of
character, education, and training within the profession, continuing to
hold firm to the belief that passivity and patience were a lawyer's
cardinal virtues. This ideology ran counter to the opinions of the
newly emerging "class" of less educated attorneys who did not favor
allowing business to seek the attorney.
Brooks, supra note 204, at 7.
207 See A.B.A. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon
27 (1908). The Canons of
Professional Ethics (Canons) were promulgated by the ABA in 1908 and were largely
adopted by the states, often with virtually no change. See DRINKER, supra note 32, at
25.
Rotunda, supra note 151, at 705.
See Pearce, supra note 200, at 1238 n.39 (noting that "[c]ommenators do not
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the profession-versus-business debate employ the term without
is some intuitive sense about the
bothering to define it, as if Sthere
210
The
failure to define the term,
word that lends it meaning.
however, may be less an oversight than the recognition that
professionalism is "like pornography, hard to define, but easy to
recognize.""'
Despite its elastic nature, however, "profession" is a term that is
"so important to lawyers that at least a working definition seems

agree on a single definition of professionalism"); Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or
One: The Concept of Legal Professionalism, 1925-1960, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYER'
PRAcrlcEs: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 144, 145 (Robert
L. Nelson, David M. Trubek, Rayman L. Solomon eds., 1992) (observing that
Indeed, an ABA
"[p]rofessionalism has no commonly accepted definition").
Commission charged with studying the decline of professionalism in the law noted
that "'Professionalism' is an elastic concept the meaning and application of which
are hard to pin down. That is perhaps as it should be. The term has a rich,
long-standing heritage, and any single definition runs the risk of being too
confining." A.B.A. Commission on Professionalism, Report: ".... In the Spirit of Public
Service": A Blueprintfor the Rekindling of Lauyer Professionalism, reprinted in 112 F.R.D.
243, 261 (1986) [hereinafter Commission on Professionalism Report].
210 Perhaps it is, as Professor Carl T. Bogus explains,
that:
[w]e are not as interested in defining "profession" or developing a
definitive list of the professions as we are in investigating the special
characteristics that influence an occupational group to make the kinds
of contributions that professions make. This may be a tautological
statement in that it says a profession is an occupation that produces
professional results, but it has meaning nonetheless: for while we may
have trouble defining the term, we intuitively know what we expect of a
profession.
Carl T. Bogus, The Death of an HonorableProfession, 71 IND. L.J. 911, 933 (1996).
211 Peter M. Brown, Professional Responsibility: Has the Rise of Megafirms
Endangered
Professionalism?,A.B.A.J., Dec. 1989, at 38. As Professor Bogus observes, "It has been
said that there are four 'true professions' - law, medicine, divinity, and the military
- but there is no obvious and common set of elements that separates these from
other occupations." Bogus, supra note 210, at 933. At the same time, however, we do
have greater expectations of lawyers than, say, mechanics, bakers, or sanitation
engineers.
Robert L. Nelson and David M. Trubek, in attempting to define lawyer
"professionalism," write that "professionalism should not be seen as a unitary or fixed
set of values, but rather as an ongoing process that defines the normative
orientations of lawyers." Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Introduction: New
Problems and New Paradigms in Studies of the Legal Profession, in LAWYERS'
IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 1,

5 (Robert L. Nelson, David M. Trubek, Rayman L. Solomon eds., 1992). If that is the
case, however, and we accept a definition of professionalism that is so elastic, it seems
that the business-profession dichotomy is illusory. That is, if it is possible for the
definition of lawyer professionalism to include the pursuit of profit as its primary
goal - because "professionalism" is not a "unitary or fixed set of values," - then
what it means to be part of the legal profession would be no different than what it
means to participate in any other business endeavor.
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essential." 2 2 Fortunately, the ABA Commission on Professionalism
(known as the Stanley Commission), which was established in 1984 to
address the decline of professionalism in the law due to the massive
infiltration of commercialism, identified several elements that fairly
characterize the legal profession:
An occupation whose members have special privileges, such as
exclusive licensing, that are justified by the following assumptions:
1. That its practice requires substantial intellectual training
and the use of complex judgments.
2. That since clients cannot adequately evaluate the quality
of the service, they must trust those they consult.
3. That the client's trust presupposes that the practitioner's
self-interest is overbalanced by devotion to serving both the
client's interest and the public good, and
4. That the occupation is self-regulating - that is, organized
in such a way as to assure the public and the courts that its
members are competent, do not violate their client's trust,
and transcend their own self-interest. s
The Stanley Commission's efforts go a long way toward defining
legal professionalism. Although the contours of what it means to be
part of a profession, or to act professionally, may still elude precise
definition, the term "profession" is invoked to distinguish the
practice of law from that of a mere business.

The particular characteristics of the "profession" are designed to
"serve the essential purpose of differentiating the practice of law from
a mere 'industry' or 'trade.'

21

5

Professor Russell G. Pearce makes this

clear when he advances three conditions, which mirror the elements
identified by the Stanley Commission, that he argues characterize the
legal "profession." These conditions also allow for a bargain between
the profession and society in which the former "agree [s] to use its
skills for the good of its clients and the public" in exchange for the
latter "ced[ing] authority to the profession, including the exclusive
right to practice law and autonomy from government and, to some
Commission on Professionalism Report, supranote 209, at 261.
Id. at 261-62.
214 See William E. Hornsby, Jr. & Kurt Schimmel, Regulating
Lawyer Advertising:
Public Images and the Irresistible Aristotelian Impulse, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCS 325, 331
(1996) ("The creation of a 'profession' . . . distinguished the lawyer from the
tradesman who generated income for his or her services.").
215 David A. Kessler, ProfessionalAsphyxiation: Why the Legal Profession
Is Gaspingfor
Breath, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 455, 455 (1997) (noting that "[t]he particular
212
213

characteristics applicable to the legal profession ... seem to expand or contract in
response to their latest quantification").
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extent, market regulation."21 6 According to Professor Pearce, the
three conditions of esoteric knowledge, altruism, and autonomy
distinguish a profession from a business and make the bargain
between the profession and society "both necessary and possible. 1 7
First, under the profession paradigm, "lawyers differ from
businesspersons in that they possess esoteric knowledge inaccessible
to lay persons."2 8 Second, "in contrast to businesspersons, who
maximize financial self-interest, lawyers altruistically place the good
of their clients and the good of society above their own selfinterest. 2 19
Finally, unlike businesses, which are subject to
government regulation and market control, the legal profession is
autonomous in that it enjoys the authority to regulate its own
members.m
As Professor Pearce's analysis suggests, the central concern of
the profession paradigm, since its inception, has been reconciling the
lawyer's call to public service with his need to maintain a livelihood.22'
216
217

Pearce, supra note 200, at 1238.
See id. Esoteric knowledge, the first condition, makes the bargain necessary

because unlike the knowledge of business, the knowledge of the legal profession is
inaccessible. See id. at 1239. Esoteric knowledge makes it difficult for lay persons to
assess the legal profession's product. See id. By contrast, people have a working
understanding of businesses "so that government could regulate them and
individuals could make knowledgeable purchases on the market." Id.
The second condition, altruism, "made the bargain acceptable."
See id.
According to Professor Pearce, because legal professionals possess esoteric
knowledge, some assurance is necessary that the profession would not exploit clients
or attempt to advance personal interests at the expense of society. See id. at 1239-40.
Lawyers thus promise to "place [ ] the interests of the common good and of their
clients above their own financial and other self-interests" to distinguish themselves
from businessmen, who simply "maximized financial self-interest." Id. at 1239. The
profession, moreover, enforces the promise of altruism through licensing, ethical
guidelines, and disciplinary bodies. See id. at 1240.
Finally, the third condition of autonomy is a necessary corollary to the first two
conditions. See id. Unlike business, "which was subject to government regulation
and market control, the profession obtained the authority to regulate itself." Id.
Thus, the notion of law as a profession, as opposed to a mere business, could be
preserved.
218 Id. at 1231.
219

Id.

220

See id. As Professor Pearce explains, the conditions of inaccessible knowledge

and altruism allowed the profession to become self-regulatory. See id.
221 Indeed, some commentators observe that "[tihe American legal profession has
never been able to reconcile the ideals of professionalism with the practical
application of commercialism in the practice of law." Hornsby & Schimmel, supra
note 214, at 331. However, the right of lawyers to be compensated for professional
services rendered has never been challenged - nor should it. See Edward D. Re, The
Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Legal Profession, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 85, 114
(1994). Rather, what the profession paradigm demands is that lawyers "resist the
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Indeed, within the practice of law, there always has been "a tension of
principle versus profit."m The profession paradigm thus begins with
the proposition that a lawyer's need to earn money is merely
incidental to his public service responsibilities.2m Roscoe Pound,
Dean Emeritus of Harvard Law School, formulated the classic
definition of professionalism in 1953 when he described it as "a
group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the
spirit of a public service."
For Dean Pound, the legal profession is
"no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of
livelihood."25 While lawyers necessarily operate within a commercial
framework, they nevertheless carry a higher responsibility that
distinguishes them from a mere tradesman who sells his services or
hawks his wares.226
The profession paradigm likewise posits that maintaining the
dignity227 and reputation of lawyers is critical because they are
temptation to make self-interest the primary, if not the sole, goal of the practice of
law." Id.
Peter A. Joy, What We Talk About When We Talk About Professionalism: A Review of
Lawyers' Ideals/Layers' Practices: Transformations in the American Legal Profession, 7
GEO.J. LEGAL ETHics 987, 1005 (1994) (book review).
223 See Re, supra note 221, at 114 ("Public service, pro bono service,
and a genuine
concern for the interests and welfare of clients should distinguish the legal
profession from business enterprises, where profit is the sole or primary goal.")
(footnote omitted).
224 ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMEs
5 (1953). The
notion that commitment to public service is a hallmark of the legal profession had
been expressed well before Dean Pound gave his classic definition of
professionalism. In 1873, for example, Edward Ryan said in a graduation address: "I
welcome you to a calling of incessant labor, high duty and grave responsibility. If our
profession be, as I believe, the most honorable, it is also the most arduous of all
secular professions. Duty is the condition of all dignity." Edward Ryan, Address to the
GraduatingLaw Students of the University of Wisconsin, 1873, 19 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
117, 117 (1943). As part of dedicating themselves to public service, the graduates
were counseled to avoid the lure of material rewards. See id.at 133.
225 POUND, supra note 224, at 5. Interestingly, though, while financial self-interest
is only an incidental concern under the profession paradigm, "the pursuit of
achievement and service was [itself] the source of financial success." Pearce, supra
note 200, at 1245. According to Professor Pearce, "The invisible hand of reputation,
and not of economic efficiency, drove the legal services market .... [and thus] the
lawyers who made the most money were those who were the most professional." Id.
Thus, while financial motivations are secondary, financial success is not incompatible
with the profession paradigm.
See LOUISE L. HILL, LAWYER ADVERTISING 40-41 (1993); see alsoJoy, supra
note
222, at 1008 ("[P] rofessionalism has historically meant the subordination of financial
reward to social responsibility.").
Professor Carl M. Selinger submits that "dignity," as it concerns lawyers,
"signifies public respect for four qualities among lawyers: their personal capabilities,
their learning, their independence and objectivity, and their faithfulness to the legal
system itself." Carl M. Selinger, The Public's Interest in Preservingthe Dignity and Unity of
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"officers of the court." Thus, as the Supreme Court has recognized,
lawyers "are essential to the primary governmental function of
administeringjustice. "22 An unfavorable public image of lawyers, it is
said, threatens to "undermine the public's respect for the fairness of
the judicial process and eventually its willingness to accept the
outcomes of that process."' 9 Undignified marketing schemes are
the Legal Profession. 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 861, 867 (1997). Professor Selinger is
concerned that public respect for each of these qualities is on the wane. See id. But
seeWatkins, supra note 197, at 776 ("Dignity is in the eye of the beholder [and] [jiust
as it is impossible to determine whether a particular advertisement is dignified, it is
impossible to conclude, on the basis of anything but taste and personal preference,
whether a particular form of advertising is dignified.").
28 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 792 (1975); see also Burnele
Venable Powell, Diagnosis and Prescription: Illusory Lawyer Disciplinary Reform and the
Need for a Moratorium, 1 J. INST. FOR STUDY OF LEGAL ETHics 263, 269 (1996)
(observing that, "[f]ar from being in pursuit of crass commercial objectives, [lawyers]
act as officers of the courts and by ultimate extension, as instruments of the public
interest"); Zelenko, supra note 150, at 1241-42 (observing that, as officers of the
court, "[llawyers may have a greater responsibility than other professionals because
their work is essential to the fair administration of justice"); L. Anita Richardson,
Stopping the Chase, A.BA.J.,Jan. 1995, at 38 (observing similar theme). Accordingly,
maintaining professional standards means no less than the preservation of our justice
system. See Todd Mitchell, Note, Privacy and Popularity: The Supreme Court Attempts to
Polish the Public Image of the Legal Profession in Florida Bar v. Went For It, 74 N.C. L.
REv. 1681, 1714 (1996) (maintaining that "true professionalism is required to sustain
our justice system"). The preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
seems to reflect this concern when it states that "[1]awyers play a vital role in the
preservation of society [and] [t] he fulfillment of this role requires an understanding
by lawyers of their relationship to our legal system." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUcT preamble (1983). The Model Rules, however, do not require lawyer
advertisements to be dignified. In fact, such a dignity requirement was intentionally
omitted from the Model Rules. The 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics expressly
provided that lawyers "should strive at all times . . . to maintain the dignity of the
profession." CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics Canon 29 (1908). The Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, in similar fashion, required lawyers to present ads "in a
dignified way." See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B)
(1980). The Model Rules, however, removed the dignity requirement on the basis
that it serves no interest recognized by the Supreme Court as a legitimate basis for
regulating advertising. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule
7.2 legal background.
M Selinger, supra note 227, at 872; see also Mitchell, supra note 228, at
1714
("When lawyers behave in an unprofessional manner, public confidence in and
respect for the legal profession decline, and, the argument goes, the vitality of our
legal system will suffer a corresponding decline."); N. Lee Cooper & Stephen F.
Humphreys, Beyond the Rules: Lawyer Image and the Scope of Professionalism, 26 CUMB. L.
REV. 923, 923 (1995-96) (stating that "confidence in the American justice system
begins with the public perception of lawyers"). One bar leader expressed the
concern that "[w]hen people lose confidence in lawyers, they lose confidence in the
rule of law. This loss jeopardizes the justice system and threatens to loosen the glue
that holds our society together." Lynne Liberato, Small Examples, Great Truths,
HOUSTON LAW., July/Aug. 1993, at 6. Professor Selinger also identifies several other
values, in addition to public respect for the judicial process, that are threatened by a
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particularly opprobrious and are deemed unprofessional, because, as
the profession paradigm insists, they lower the public's estimation of
lawyers y0
Under the profession paradigm, Osias's marketing campaign is
objectionable both for its blatant commercialism, as well as for its
undignified subject matter. First, Osias places profit over principle by
essentially "hawking her wares." In fact, Osias violates the profession
paradigm simply by resorting to advertising.
The profession
paradigm eschews all forms of commercialism, including
advertising,231 because commercialism entails the maximization of
financial self-reward which, it is claimed, necessarily conflicts with the
commitment to selfless public service.3 2 Moreover, "any commercial
decline in dignity of the legal profession, including
the recruitment of capable and learned individuals to the legal
profession, the assurance that all lawyers will receive a broad,
theoretical legal education, protection of the public from lawyer
wrongdoing, the willingness of potential clients to use lawyers when
they should do so, and the performance by the profession of its "public
citizen" role, which includes a role in supporting the rule of law.
Selinger, supranote 227, at 886.
230 See Rotunda, supra note 151, at 703 ("[t]he avowed purpose [of prohibitions
against undignified advertisements] is to protect the public image of the legal
profession"); Hornsby & Schimmel, supra note 214, at 328 (noting that the impetus
behind regulations on lawyer advertising stems from the assumption that
"sensationalized ads cause the public to have a lowered image of the legal
profession").
The Supreme Court's lawyer advertising cases are blamed for
diminishing the public's respect for the judicial process. It has been argued that
when the Court afforded constitutional protection to lawyer advertising, the Court
invited
the trained advocates of our most competitive profession ... to stoop
to the values of the marketplace. Many accepted the invitation. As
lawyer advertising rapidly degenerated into today's exploitative
carnival, the public's level of confidence in the bar plummeted.
Moreover, the profession of the law is integrally associated with... the
judicial branch of government. Put more bluntly, from the public's
point-of-view, judges are lawyers with robes. The unfortunate long
term result of attorney advertising. . . was that the public's perception
of the integrity of the judicial branch of government was marred.
Amicus Curiae Brief for The Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers at 4, Florida Bar v.
Went ForIt, 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (No. 94-226).
231 See Pearce, supra note 200, at 1259 (opining that "'pure' professionalism
is
hostile to business conduct, such as advertising or ancillary business practices");
Powell, supra note 228, at 269 (explaining the view that "advertising is incompatible
with the duties of a professional"); Jonathan K. Van Patten, Lawyer Advertising,
ProfessionalEthics, and the Constitution, 40 S.D. L. REv. 212, 217 (1995) (stating that
"advertising is said to tarnish the dignified public image of the profession").
2
See Whitney Thier, Comment, In a Dignified Manner: The Bar, the Court, and
Lawyer Advertising, 66 TUL. L. REV. 527, 540 (1991) ("Money-making, if 'incidental,' is
not in itself contemptible."); Re, supra note 221, at 113 ("[Tlhe principal goal of
[belonging to the legal profession] is to serve clients, as well as to administer justice
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practice by lawyers runs the risk of spillover effects, or negative
externalities, on other lawyers or the administration of justice as a
whole."2 As Dean Pound warned, one of the most serious threats to
the profession paradigm is lawyers "mak[ing] the money-making
aspect of the calling the primary or even the sole interest."2 4
Osias's ads are also objectionable because of their presumably
offensive, and hence undignified, subject matter. The fear of the
profession paradigm is that such ads will lower the public image of
the legal profession. m This will, in turn, jeopardize the public's
confidence in lawyers and the judicial process itself.2 Most lawyers
surveyed about Osias's ads have complained that they demean the
profession, to say nothing about how the ads demean women." 7 The
president of the Nassau County Bar declared Osias's ads "a disgrace
that degrades the profession."2 Other ethics observers have decried
the ads for being in poor taste and eroding the public view of
lawyers.23
[and] [t]
he key ideal of the profession is service, rather than maximization of profits
and billable hours."). But see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 379 (1977)
("It is at least somewhat incongruous for the opponents of advertising to extol the
virtues and altruism of the legal profession at one point, and, at another, to assert
that its members will seize the opportunity to mislead and distort.").
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession:
Constraints on Lauryers'FirstAmendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 569, 582 (1998).
Indeed, advertising is considered antithetical to the profession because:
[b]y its very nature, advertising involves the calculated manipulation of
symbols to shape consumer preferences.
As to whether such
preferences reflect real needs or merely reflect desires that the media
promotes until individuals finally come to view them as necessities, the
marketplace is indifferent. Equally so, when legal representation is
fostered by advertising, the market is indifferent to whether the
requested services are pursued to vindicate that which the public has
defined as good or what an individual rationalizes as desirable.
Powell, supra note 228, at 269-70.
POUND, supra note 224, at 354.
35 See Hornsby & Schimmel, supra note 214, at 328.
2M
Seeid. at331.
27 See Tennen, supra note 1, at 8.
In fact, as a general matter, lawyers have
become concerned with the decline of professionalism. A 1990 survey revealed that
almost 65% of attorneys bemoaned that law had become less a profession and more a
business. See Margaret C. Fish, Lawyers Give Thumbs Up,NAT' L.J., May 18, 1990, at
S2.
Wise, supra note 4, at 1. While leaders of the bar express fear that negative
publicity swirling around Osias's ad campaign will rub off on the profession itself and
harm the public image of all lawyers, Osias simply responds that they are "jealous" of
her success. See Exhibit A: When Networking Isn't Enough, NAT'LL.J., Dec. 11, 1995, at
A10 [hereinafter Networking].
M9 See Wise, supra note 4, at 1. Although Osias's use of sex to
sell legal services is
the primary reason her ads are considered undignified, her emphasis on profit also
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The profession paradigm is concerned that "a wholesale
depression of the legal profession, brought on by a belief that the law
may not be a high and noble calling, and may in fact be a business
instead of a profession, could lead to its societal ineffectiveness.",2
Adherents of the profession paradigm insist that it is not enough
simply to speak of professional values. Rather, "[b]y words and by
deed, lawyers should conduct themselves as members of a noble
profession dedicated to public service and the administration of
justice." 4 ' That is the essence of the profession paradigm. Yet Osias's
words and deeds seem to reflect very different values. Roping up five
men in their underwear as part of an effort to sell legal services
hardly seems to inspire faith in the practice of law as a higher calling,
detached from the crass commercialism of the larger culture. As one
adherent of the profession paradigm urges:
It must be made clear that what is permissible in other areas of
commerce is not permissible in ours. The argument that no
direct injury is shown from distasteful ads cannot be allowed to
carry the day .... Attorneys cannot simply create market share by
hiring an ad agency. This is still a profession where steadily
making one's way, building trust and reputation through effort
and self-improvement, must be the paradigm. We are of our
culture, but we need not sink with it.
Despite the impassioned rhetoric by adherents of the profession
paradigm, however, the view that law is a profession, not a business,
has been steadily eroding over the last several decades. As the next
section details, the legal field has witnessed the emergence of a new
paradigm, the business paradigm, which has successfully challenged,
and is gradually replacing, the dominance of the profession
paradigm. Moreover, recent developments in the law promise only to
ties into the dignity analysis. See Thier, supra note 232, at 528 (explaining that "it is
incumbent upon lawyers that they be dignified in order to maintain the public
confidence [because] [t] he hallmark of dignity and professionalism lies in unselfish
public service, which can be achieved only through suppression of the profit
motive").
240 Hornsby & Schimmel, supra note 214, at 331.
While Hornsby and Schimmel
do not find this argument credible or persuasive, they do argue that the public image
of the profession could be valuable insofar as its effect on the self-image of lawyers is
concerned. See id.
:41
4

Re, supranote 221, at 114.

Robert Battey, Note, Loosening the Glue:

Lawyer Advertising, Solicitation and

Commercialism in 1995, 9 GIo. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 287, 319 (1995); see also Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 63 FoRDHAM L. REv. 949, 956-57
(1995) ("We must remember that if lawyers are to continue to claim status as a
profession, we must proclaim and enforce standards that are compatible with those
of a profession.").
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hasten the sweep toward the business paradigm in the future,
portentously raising issues for proponents of the profession
paradigm.
These proponents believe that any decline in
professionalism will be occasioned by deleterious consequences for
both lawyers and society at large.
B. The Rise of the Business Paradigm: Promptinga Professionalism
Crisis Within the Law
Although historically a tension existed within the law between
principle and profit, the growing consensus in recent decades is that
the latter is triumphing over the former. Osias's ads represent the
triumph of profit over principle, as the prospects of financial selfreward have prevailed against the competing aspirations of the
profession paradigm. 43
In a legal climate dominated by the
profession paradigm, Osias never would be able to use sexually
provocative ads to attract clients, at least not with impunity. In fact,
legal advertising of any sort is considered unprofessional under the
profession paradigm.2 Under the business paradigm, however, only
market forces serve as a deterrent, and, if a particular marketing
strategy proves to be commercially successful, as in Osias's case, there
may be no deterrence at all.
Osias is clearly a disciple of the business paradigm, and she
means business.
In most of her public statements, and in
appearances before business groups, Osias is "expound[ing] her
2
views that 'a little cleavage, a little leg' can get a businesswoman far",
and counseling women that, to be successful in the legal field, they
must use their "sexual weapons" to "manipulate men."24 At the same

time, Osias spurns the profession paradigm and battles a powerful
state bar that seeks to temper her pursuit of profit by forcing her to
observe standards of professionalism set forth in disciplinary
243 Interestingly,
in pursuing her marketing campaign, Osias herself exploited a
tension, albeit a qualitatively different one, that exists between men and women. As
Osias explains, "there's a sexual tension that always exists between men and women
and women have to learn to use it to their advantage and manipulate it [in order to
draw attention and to get men to advance women]." Lawyer Sells Sex Appeal, supra
note 25.
244 See Pearce, supra note 200, at 1259; Powell, supra note 228,
at 269.
2
James Bernstein, Inside Stories, NEWSDAY, May 5, 1997, at C3.

24

See Leggy Lawyers, supra note 3, at 12. As Osias has explained elsewhere, "[a]

man's vulnerable point is his desire for sex. Why not, women, use it? Not to walk
around with a couch, but to use it as an enticement, to get that male person to
mentor you."
Women Spotlighted by Scandal on THE GERALDO RIVERA SHOW
(Investigative New Group television broadcast, Aug. 27, 1998), available in
WESTLAW, 1998 WL 3235433 [hereinafter Women Spotlighted by Scandal].
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regulations. 47 Profit, not principle, rules Osias's actions, and thus the
consequences of her ads on the professional reputation of other
lawyers is merely a secondary concern for her.
The mere fact that a lawyer actually attempts to use sex to sell
legal services is perhaps the best attestation to the rise of the business
paradigm in American law today. As one legal commentator recently
observed, "the widespread perception [today] is that law practice is a
business.",2 0 While there has long been a concern that creeping
commercialism is transforming the practice of law into a business,24 9
what is different about the last several decades, especially after Bates,
"is that concern over commercialism has become a crisis." 250 Indeed,
the ascension of the business paradigm has provoked a
professionalism crisis within the law. 51
The rise of the business paradigm is attributable both to changes
in Supreme Court jurisprudence and to increased competition within
247 See supra notes 1-14 and accompanying
text.
248 Pearce, supra note 200, at 1232; see also Thier, supra note 232,

at 540
("Commercialism is rampant in the legal profession.").
249 The concern over whether the law is losing its professional
aspects and
becoming a business has persisted since the turn of the century. See Bogus, supra
note 210, at 913; Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil
Justice, 28 GA. L. REv. 633, 670 (1994) (stating that "the sense that law has declined
from a noble profession infused with civic virtue to commercialism . . . has been a
recurrent theme for at least a hundred years").
2W Bogus, supra note 210, at 913 (citation omitted). The Court
in Bates escalated
the profession-versus-business debate when it rejected the bar's assertion that
advertising to attract business is unprofessional. As the Court stated:
We recognize, of course, and commend the spirit of public service with
which the profession of law is practiced and to which it is dedicated...
.But we find the postulated connection between advertising and the
erosion of true professionalism to be severely strained. At its core, the
argument presumes that attorneys must conceal from themselves and
from their clients the real-life fact that lawyers earn their livelihood at
the bar. We suspect that few attorneys engage in such self-deception.
And rare is the client, moreover, even one of modest means, who
enlists the aid of an attorney with the expectation that his services will
be rendered free of charge.
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 368-69 (1997). The Supreme Court's
lawyer advertising cases following Bates have reflected the polar tensions of the
debate. See Steven H. Hobbs, Ethics in the Age of Entrepreneurship,39 S. Thx. L. REv.
599, 611 (1998) (stating that "the old profession-business debate . . . ha[s] been
simmering since Bates"). Justice O'Connor obviously has been the most stalwart
defender of the profession paradigm; this support is illustrated by the Justice's
defense of the paradigm in numerous dissenting opinions prior to Went For IL
Although the Court's holding in Went For It is narrow, see supra notes 156-78 and
accompanying text, the decision is in many ways a vindication of Justice O'Connor's
position - and a long-awaited one at that. See Battey, supranote 242, at 318 ("Justice
O'Connor certainly deserved her day in the sun after all these years.").
25 See Pearce, supra note 200,
at 1232.
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the practice of law. 2 As recounted in Part I, the Supreme Court was
pivotal in facilitating greater competition, and hence greater
commercialism, when the Court relaxed regulations against lawyer
marketing under cover of constitutionalism.' s The assault on the
profession paradigm was fully joined in 1977 when the Court handed
down Bates. Justice Blackmun, who wrote the majority opinion,
boldly declared that "the belief that lawyers are somehow 'above'
trade has become an anachronism, 25 thus lending legitimacy to the
business paradigm within legal circles. 5
Even if Went For It
reinvigorates the profession paradigm and signals a shift away from
the business paradigm, at least in Supreme Court jurisprudence which seems unlikely given the Court's narrow holding25 6 - what is
clear is that "overturning Bates would not change the role that the
Bates decision has played in confirming that the perspective of law as
a business had moved from
the margin to the center of the legal
257
community's discourse."

While Bates validated the business paradigm by allowing it to
prosper constitutionally, legal commentators have fostered its growth

252

See Bogus, supra note 210, at 913 ("The commercialization of the practice of

law is often attributed to increased competition."). As competition increases, even
more aggressive marketing schemes, such as Osias's ads, can be expected simply out
of economic reality. SeeJames Parkerson Roy, Marketing a Law PracticeDoes Not Harm
the System, 43 LA. B.J. 18, 20 (1995) ("The practice of law today is truly a business, and
all businesses must market their services or products to the public as a matter of
economic necessity.").
253 Commentators have observed that "[b]y permitting legal advertising,
the Court
allowed the profession to fully enter the entrepreneurial age." Hobbs, supra note
250, at 605; see also Re, supra note 221, at 98 (stating that "much of the perceived
commercialism of the legal profession has been directly attributed to attorney
advertising"). What is perhaps most egregious, however, is that the Court created its
commercial speech jurisprudence, including lawyer advertising rights, out of whole
cloth. As one commentator observed, "[t]he Court's extension of free speech
protection to advertising has provoked the criticism that it revives the spirit of Lochner
v. New York, substituting judicial for legislative judgments of what degree of
regulation best serves the public's economic welfare." Sullivan, supra note 233, at
576-77 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1908)).
Bates, 433 U.S. at 371-72. Justice Blackmun attacked the apparent presumption
of the profession paradigm "that attorneys must conceal from themselves and from
their clients the real-life fact that lawyers earn their livelihood at the bar." Id. at 368.
255 As Professor Pearce explains, Bates makes the view that law is a business "a
resgectable position in mainstream legal discourse." Pearce, supranote 200, at 1249.
See supra Part II. But see Battey, supra note 242, at 290 (arguing that "the
wilderness of almost unfettered commercialism, toward which the Court was
heading, was a dangerous, minatory place, and that the Court's gradual return to
older notions of professionalism and dignity should continue and should accelerate
[due to Went ForIt]").
257 Pearce, supranote 200, at 1249-50.
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by exposing as hypocritical the historical justifications for the
profession paradigm.
Commentators have observed that the
regulations against advertising and solicitation adopted in the early
1900s"5' did not affect lawyers associated with the bar because they
were, for the most part, business lawyers." 9 Rather, the proscriptions
directly affected small and solo practitioners who had difficulty
attracting clients.' 6 Indeed, regulations such as the ban on lawyer
advertising have been decried "as a hypocritical exercise in
constraining the business conduct of small and solo practitioners
firms, such as the use of
while permitting the business practices of big
6'
clients.0
wealthy
recruit
to
networks
social
The ethics rules of the profession paradigm also have been
attacked as functioning as perverse instruments of the professional
elite to maintain their social standing during the turn of the century.
As one observer notes, there is "ample evidence" to support the view
that the advertising ban, for example, "is rooted in trade restrictions
imposed in the early 1900s to ensure that 'the right people' practiced
law., 262 After all, advertising was not only permitted in the practice of
law during the nineteenth century, but it was "common and
acceptable. 263 In fact, even Abraham Lincoln advertised.
Some
legal historians have linked the severe marketing restrictions of the

258
259

See, e.g., CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL EThics Canon 27 (1908).
See Brooks, supra note 204, at 9 (observing that "[t]he lawyers associated with

the ABA who formulated and implemented the Canons were primarily commercial
lawyers who represented large clients, rather than the small, less dignified
practitioners").
260 Id. (commenting that, given the composition of the
bar, "it is not surprising
that proscriptions against advertising and solicitation did not impact the practice of
the well established lawyer, but rather worked to the disadvantage of the small law
firm and solo practitioner who had problems procuring clients").
26
Pearce, supra note 200, at 1247; see also Bates, 433 U.S. at 370-71 (noting that
"cynicism with regard to the profession may be created by the fact that it long has
publicly eschewed advertising, while condoning the actions of the attorney who
structures his social or civic associations so as to provide contact with potential
clients").
262 Alan S. Flink, Legal Advertising Facts, Myths and Recommendations
- Report of the
A.B.A.
Commission
on
Advertising,
43
R.I.
B.J.
13,
17
(1995).
20

See id.

See id. Abraham Lincoln's ad ran in the August 10, 1838 edition of the
Sangamo Journal and read: "STUART & LINCOLN, Attorneys and Counsellors at
Law, will practice, conjointly, in the Courts of this Judicial Circuit - Office No. 4
Hoffman's Row, upstairs. Springfield." LoRi B. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN:
LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION 1 (1980).
But see Burger, supra note 242, at
955 (arguing that it is no 'Justification to assert that there is a long history of
advertising ....[because] [t]
oday's slick advertising campaigns bear no resemblance
264

-

absolutely none

-

to what Lincoln did").
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profession paradigm to discriminatory efforts by a predominantly
Anglo-Saxon elite to keep Catholic and Jewish immigrants from
practicing law in the early twentieth century.'
Others have viewed
the restrictions as anti-consumer devices designed to artificially
inflate the price of legal services.26 The rhetoric of the profession
paradigm, meanwhile, has been attacked as simply a mask to conceal
the profit-driven motives of lawyers. 67
Commentators highlight that the irony of the profession
paradigm was that business lawyers in the 1900s, while railing against
commercialism, which they claimed threatened to swallow the
profession, and stressing the importance of selfless public service and
dignity, were nevertheless profit-driven and pursued great wealth and
power.269 Today, more than ever, the rhetoric of the profession
paradigm is assailed as self-serving. Critics question whether there is
a meaningful difference between, on the one hand, small and solo
practitioners who market their services through television, radio, or
magazine ads, and, on the other hand, lawyers at large firms who
promote their firms at eating and social clubs. Why is it, critics ask,
that efforts by the former to procure clients are considered, from an
ethics standpoint, undignified and questionable, while the efforts of
corporate law firms to attract clients are considered tasteful and
acceptable, even though the two groups
are simply promoting their
270
practices through different methods?
Harsh criticism has been leveled at the organized bar for
"seemingly subscrib[ing] to the view that profit motivation is
unprofessional when it is flaunted before the public, but not when it
See Pearce, supra note 200, at 1247; see also Joy, supra note 222, at 1000

(explaining that the profession paradigm has been used "to discriminate against
relious and racial minorities").
See Pearce, supra note 200, at 1247-48 (describing opposition to the profession

paradigm by consumer advocates such as Ralph Nader and Mark Green).

e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM
114-15
(1975); see generally Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional
Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REv. 702 (1977). The profession paradigm has also been
267 See,

attacked for allowing lawyers to maintain a monopoly over the practice of law. See
Pearce, supra note 200, at 1248; Joy, supra note 222, at 1000.
See Thier, supra note 232, at 537-41 (noting the sanctimony of corporate
lawyers/bar leaders who, while "decrying commercialism in the legal profession, and
advocating dignity and public service," nevertheless pursued great wealth and
power).
26 See Flink, supra note 262, at 16-17.
270 See id. at 17 (observing that "[m]ost find the 'marketing' of the corporate law
firm to be essentially in good taste and acceptable and the solo or small practitioner's
advertising program, particularly if it is on radio or television, to be at best,
questionable").
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occurs behind oak-paneled walls.011 Unremarkably, critics of the
profession paradigm have also noted that restrictions on legal
advertising do not affect most of the lawyers who espouse them
because those individuals practice in settings in which the restrictions
are irrelevant, further exposing the hypocrisy of the paradigm.2 "
This is borne out by Osias's experience in the New York real
estate market where established lawyers, who are mostly male, rely on
networking opportunities to generate business, and thus are not
dependent on advertising to sustain a livelihood. For Osias, by
contrast, advertising was essential to the success of her practice.
Despite spending several years, as she claims, relying on traditional
networking strategies to generate business, she could not attract
clients because the male lawyers of the "old boy's network" would
"give each other the business.",2 73 If Osias's account is accurate, then
advertising restrictions in the New York legal market would indeed
serve to keep nouveaux legal upstarts down by hindering their ability
to attract new clients or, more importantly, to take old clients away
from more established lawyers in the field.
Regardless of whether the attacks on the profession paradigm
are fully warranted, the reality is that commercialism is rampant
within the practice of law today. The surfeit of lawyers today has
74
made resort to commercialism virtually necessary for some lawyers.
271 Thier, supra note 232, at 541 (adding that "the view
that commercialism is
unprofessional stands as a glaring and reprehensible hypocrisy"); see also Hornsby &
Schimmel, supra note 214, at 335 (observing that the 'justification for restrictions on
business-getting techniques [has come] at the cost of accusations of elitism and
hypocrisy").
See Hornsby & Schimmel, supra note 214, at 335 ("Many of those who advocate
restrictions in the name of public interest have either been in practice settings where
the restrictions are not relevant or are among those forced to preserve a practice or
otherwise compete with those lawyers who would or do advertise."); LAWYER
ADVERTISING AT THE CROSSROADS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION I (1995) ("Many who
oppose advertising complain about its effects on the image of the profession but in
fact are far more concerned about the fiscal impact on their practice."); see also
Pearce, supra note 200, at 1260 (describing view of some legal commentators who
believe that "taboos on business behavior are illegitimate products of a bigoted bar
elite").
273 France, supra note
1, at A10.
274 See Bogus, supranote 210, at 914 (noting that, as measured by
statistical figures
documenting the increase in the number of lawyers in the last several decades,
"competition became more than twice as stiff for lawyers over the past two decades,
and with law schools now producing 38,000 new lawyers annually, the screw is
tightening every year") (footnote omitted). Of course, small and solo practitioners,
and the fierce competition between them, are in no way singularly responsible for
the rise of the business paradigm in the last several decades. If anything, large firms
are just as responsible for elevating the business paradigm over the profession
paradigm. Legal observers have commented that, for corporate law firms in the last
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Meanwhile, the ever-increasing number of lawyers will only fuel
competition and ensure even greater commercialism in the future."5
The figures are staggering. Current projections indicate that there
will be over one million lawyers in the United States by the turn of
the century.2 76 For over one hundred years, up until 1970, the growth
in the number of lawyers was commensurate with the growth of the
general population.2" In 1960, for example, the ratio of lawyers to
By
the general population was one lawyer for every 627 persons.'
1991, however, the ratio had changed dramatically to approximately
one lawyer for every 295 persons.2" Although total enrollment at
several decades, '"a new era has dawned, one in which the practice of law has ceased
to be a gentlemanly profession and instead has become an extremely competitive
business.'" Pearce, supra note 200, at 1254 (quoting Tamar Lewin, A Gentlemanly
Profession Enters a Tough New Era, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1983, § 3, at 1). In addition,
"[h]igh salaries of lawyers and billing practices exacerbate the growing feeling that
the practice of law is becoming, or has already become, more of a business or
commercial activity rather than a profession, the purpose of which is to render
service." Re, supra note 221, at 98. The transformation of the law is apparent as
partners at large corporate law firms now get paid comparable to big business
executives, often commanding salaries of over one million dollars annually. See
Pearce, supra note 200, at 1251. Meanwhile, the commitment to selfless public
service at the top law firms is claimed to be conspicuously absent. SeeJoy, supra note
222, at 1007 (reporting that the "commitment to pro bono work is absent among
may of the top 100 income-producing law firms").
See Kessler, supra note 215, at 460 ("There are a variety of causes for the overall
increase in competition and commercialism within the practice of law, the most
obvious of which is the sheer number of people entering the profession."); Bogus,
supra note 210, at 913-14 (noting that "the factor generally accorded the greatest
weight in increasing competition - and hence commercialism - within the bar is
the enormous growth in the number of lawyers over the past two decades").
Compounding matters even further is the "ever-increasing debt load from loans
necessary to cover the costs of obtaining a law degree." Kessler, supra note 215, at
477. The enormous debt loads of new law school graduates "has led to an extreme
limitation on available avenues of practice, the main option being an associate
position with a large firm for those fortunate to receive an offer." Id. In other words,
mounting debt is forcing new graduates, out of economic necessity, to focus on the
business side of the law rather than its public service side. Id. ("[t]his 'new breed of
law student may be more moved by self-promotion . . . than by vague notions of
justice, equality, and reform'") (quoting Graham C. Lilly, Law Schools Without
Lauers? Winds of Change inLegalEducation,81 VA. L. REV. 1421, 1450 (1995)).
See Re, supra note 221, at 104.
7 See Kessler, supra note 215, at 460 (adding that, today, the number of lawyers is
"more than twice its historical average").
27 See id.
279 See Re, supra note 221, at 104. Compare the ratio in the United States with
Japan's where there is one lawyer for every 10,000 persons, and the glut of lawyers
domestically becomes striking. See id. On the other hand, "[s]ome observers tend to
explain the difference by noting the relative disuse of the formal legal system by the
Japanese, and by the Japanese concept of justice that places a greater value on the
importance of community." Id.
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America's law schools has fallen off slightly in the last two years or
so,"' the general consensus is that, when it comes to lawyers in
America, there are just "too many of them. 2 8 '
An increased number of lawyers, of course, means increased
competition.8 3 An inundated legal marketplace, in turn, breeds
cutthroat commercial practices and spawns an "urgency to procure
Osias's coquettish ads personify
clients by any means necessary."2
Her
the urgency of procuring clients "by any means necessary."'
280 See Jennifer L. Reichert, More Students Apply to Law School, Fewer Enroll,
TRIAL,
June 1998, at 95 ("While the number of applications to law school has increased, the
total enrollment fell for the second year in a row, according to the ABA. It recently
reported that in October 1996, a total of 128,623 students were enrolled in law
schools. One year later, that number had dropped to 125,886 - a 2.1 percent
decrease.").
281 See Kessler, supra note 215, at 460; see also Richard J. Cebula,
Does Lawyer
Advertising Adversely Influence the Image of Lawyers in the United States? An Alternative
Perspective and New EmpiricalEvidence, 27J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 510 (1998) (noting how
"[t]he number of lawyers has risen dramatically over the last quarter century");
Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon, The Socratic Method-Problem Method Dichotomy: The Debate
over Teaching Method Continues, 1998 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 1, 15 (1998) (commenting
on "the 'boom' in the number of law school graduates during the 1960's, 1970's, and
1980's"); Mike Jay Garcia, Key Trends in the Legal Profession, 71 FLORIDA B.J. 16, 24
(1997) (citing a 1995 survey conducted by the Florida Bar finding that lawyers
complained about "too many attorneys and too much competition" within the
practice of law). A running joke among comedians is that "there will soon be more
lawyers than people." Re, supra note 221, at 105.
Ironically, as more and more lawyers are admitted into the practice, the need
to rely on advertising, especially eye-catching advertising, increases substantially
because of greater competition. One solution for dealing with excessive competition
is to regulate entry into the practice rather than attempting to regulate the
tremendous number of lawyers who are actually admitted to the bar. See Brooks,
supra note 204, at 29 ("State bar associations should regulate the perceived problem
of advertising at the beginning, and not at the end, by strongly encouraging the
nation's law schools to personally address the problem of attorney gluL").
283 Seeid. at 28.
N4 It has already been explained that Osias's marketing
scheme violates the
profession paradigm by maximizing financial self-interest and extolling the pursuit of
profit at the expense of a commitment to altruism. See supra notes 231-39 and
accompanying text. Under the profession paradigm, a lawyer is required "to temper
one's selfish pursuit of economic success by adhering to standards of conduct."
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 488 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Contrary to Dean Pound's admonishment, Osias appears to make moneymaking her
primary ambition as opposed to an incidental concern. See POUND, supra note 224, at
5. Unabashedly commercial, Osias is "hawking her wares" rather than subordinating
her commercial self-interest in favor of a devotion to selfless public service. Osias's
ads are also claimed to be imperiling the public image of the legal profession
because of their sexual subject matter. Osias's ads thus violate the profession
paradigm by undermining public respect for lawyers and, hence, public respect for
the judicial process itself. The New York Supreme Court's Grievance Committee
warned Osias that her marketing scheme "casts the legal profession in a negative
light and invites both criticism and ridicule." Scott Brede, Fleshing Out New Clients,
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willingness to break open, actually, to break wide open, the taboos of
the profession paradigm only underscores the enormous economic
pressures facing lawyers today. 85 More often than not, "the catalyst
behind 'unprofessional' advertising is the attorneys [sic] need to
make a living. ",216 In Osias's case, the struggle for economic survival
was the impetus behind her advertising campaign. Traditional
barriers, such as Osias's need to break through the "glass ceiling" of a
"completely male-dominated" real estate industry in New York," 7
merely exacerbated her financial difficulties, leading her to resort to
a marketing
campaign heretofore unheard of within the practice of
28
law.
CONN. LAwTRIBUNE, Sept. 1, 1997, at 1.
285

See Kessler, supranote 215, at 461 (noting that "the increasing use of aggressive

advertising... demonstrates the fundamental shift in the practice of law toward selfpreservation and client attraction").
286 Brooks, supra note 204, at 28; see also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S.
350, 354 (1977) (noting that the attorneys in that case also resorted to advertising
due to economic struggles).
287 See Wise, supra note 4, at 1.
Even the legal press in New York has been
denounced for purportedly displaying a bias against women. As one reader of the
New York Law Journal, who expressed outrage over the paper's coverage of Osias
advertisements, stated:
I am a member of the bar and female, and I see nothing wrong with
Rosalie Osias's advertisements. Some people are afraid to be creative
or perhaps just do not have the ability. Kudos to Ms. Osias for
knowing her market and for being bold enough to tap into it.
Among other things, law is a business. And in a society where a
publication like the Law Journal - 40 percent of whose readership, I
would guess, is comprised of members of that profession who happen
to be female - takes a gender-neutral term like "lawyer" and feels
compelled to modify it with the word "woman" - a choice which
reinforces an implied (and what I heretofore thought was blessedly
moribund) association of "lawyer" with "male" (otherwise why the need
for modification?), a lawyer whose gender still (1) generates a modifier
needs to use everything in her arsenal to develop her practice.
Query: If a male lawyer had run an analogous ad campaign for his
practice, would the Law Journal headline have read, "Male Lawyer's
Suggestive Ads Stir Ire..."? And, on a different level, in the case of a
male, would ire have been stirred?
Sandra L. Mallenbaum, Colleague in Gender Sees Ads as Creative, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 29,
1995, at 2.
28 Some legal observers, while conceding that Osias faced barriers in the New
York legal market, nevertheless impugned her methods for overcoming them. An
editorial in the NationalLawJournal observed that while Osias's desire to "crack the
glass ceiling protecting the male-dominated corporate culture" may sound noble,
"even if this poppycock were true, it's hardly the best way to do it." Editorial, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 11, 1997, at A20. Another commentator, while acknowledging "the plight
of fledging young attorneys in an era of oversupply of lawyers and a general
reshaping of the profession," asks:
[H]aven't the same practice start-up concerns faced by today's new
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In the future, the legal community can only expect more lawyer
marketing that breaks through the traditional constraints of the
profession paradigm, further leading to the impression that the
practice of law is a business rather than a profession.8 9 It is unclear,
however, how the public image of lawyers would be affected if
particular segments of the legal market became saturated by Osias's
particular brand of advertising. It is one thing to have only one Osias
in the market, as there is now, routinely using sexual allure to sell
legal services. It would be quite another matter to have hundreds of
lawyers using risqu6 or salacious ads to attract clients. Conceivably,
there could be a serious public backlash if a large number of lawyers
decided to rely on sexually provocative ads.
On the other hand, it is possible that Osias's marketing scheme
is nothing more than a novelty, albeit a highly successful one. After
all, a large number of lawyers are not sitting in law firm conference
rooms drawing up marketing strategies to figure out how much skin
they should flash in order to attract clients.2
In fact, despite the
erosion of the profession paradigm in the last several decades, many
lawyers still seem to think that Osias's ads are unbecoming of a
lawyer.2'
lawyers been around for years? Why not use the same methods to
establish a practice that lawyers used before advertising was permitted?
Curator duty, referrals from "mentors," lawyer referral services and
referrals from family members, business associates, social contacts and
acquaintances proved successful in the past and could be no less
productive now ....
HarryJ. Philips,Jr., Advertising Detractsfrom the ProfessionalImage of Lawyers, 43 LA. B.J.
19, 22 (1995).
289 Ironically, whereas the growth of the bar in the latter nineteenth century
led to
the creation of the profession paradigm in order to suppress the commercialism
perceived to be invading the law, the massive lawyer explosion today is undermining
theorofession paradigm and giving rise to the business paradigm within the law.
When questioned about whether the legal community could expect similar
ads
like those by Osias, most lawyers who were surveyed responded that others "may try it
but probably wouldn't get away with it." Tennen, supra note 1, at 1. Other lawyers, in
fact, may not run similar ads because of the belief that such a campaign would not be
commercially viable - a theory that, based on Osias's success, is not self-evident.
From an ethics standpoint, moreover, Osias has gotten away with it, at least based
upon the fact that the Nassau County Bar ultimately decided not to pursue
disciplinary actions against her. See No Bar to the Sexy Ads, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, OCL
31, 1995, at 1. After the disciplinary investigation against her was closed, Osias issued
a press release proclaiming that her position had been vindicated and that "lawyers
can now use plenty of cleavage and leg in advertising." Today's News: Update, N.Y.
L.J.,July 31, 1997, at 1. Shortly thereafter, however, a grievance committee was once
again investigating Osias to determine whether her press release contained "false and
misleading statements." See id.
2 See France, supra note 1, atAl0.
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Moreover, if legal ads that employ sexual imagery do tarnish
lawyers' reputations, as the profession paradigm insists, then it is
reasonable to assume that lawyers simply will not employ such ads. As
highlighted by justice Kennedy's dissent in Went ForIt, the problem of
offensive legal marketing is "largely self-policing [because]
[p]otential clients will not hire lawyers who offend them." 2 Indeed,
it has been argued that "the market tends to be self-correcting"
because lawyers, pursuing their economic self-interest, will not rely on
marketing strategies that damage their reputations.2 3
The view that offensive or undignified lawyer ads are selfpolicing, however, presupposes that such ads do, in fact, damage the
reputations, or more accurately, the commercial well-being, of
individual lawyers who pursue such ad campaigns. The shortcoming
of such a view is that, although such ads may negatively impact the
image of the profession as a whole, the prospects of financial gain
from a particular marketing campaign will encourage the individual
lawyer to pursue it, regardless of its impact on other lawyers. Again,
Osias's example is relevant. A slew of lawyers and bar leaders
expressed their fervent outrage over Osias's ads, many of whom
claimed she would bring disrepute to the profession,/ and even
Florida Bar v. Went For It, 515 U.S. 618, 643 (1995) (KennedyJ, dissenting).
Watkins, supra note 197, at 782 (arguing that lawyers will not market
themselves in a manner that "tarnish[es] their own reputations or damage[s]
consumer trust"); Hobbs, supra note 250, at 618 ("noting that (l]awyers who
overreach their clients or are obnoxious in their pursuit of business will lose
clients"); Flink, supra note 262, at 19 (stating that "the marketplace should and will
eliminate... tasteless and undignified ads").
Several lawyers commented that Osias's advertising demeans women and
"trivializes" and "hurts" the legal profession. See Tennen, supra note 1, at 8. One
lawyer commented: "People already have ajaded view of attorneys. Using sex to sell
is not only demeaning to the profession but to women as well." Id. Another lawyer
remarked: "We have to remind ourselves that we are advertising the legal profession
and not a nightclub." Id. It has been reported that "[m]ost of the women in the
industry 'are appalled' by the advertising campaign and are unlikely to give Ms. Osias
work when they reach positions of influence." France, supra note 1, at A1O. One
female lawyer commented: "I'm not a bad-looking woman, but I would never use my
sexuality to get business." Id. Bar leaders have likewise condemned Osias's ads. A
former member of the Professional Ethics Committee of the Nassau County Bar
Association stated that "this type of advertising is in bad taste. It creates a bad image
for lawyers who are already getting a bad rap." Class Act Graces Classy Profession, SUNSENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Oct. 6, 1995, at 12A. Meanwhile, William F. Levine,
president of the Bar Association of Nassau County called Osias "a public menace"
and stated: "If I weren't a lawyer and I saw a lawyer cavorting that way... I'd think
less of that lawyer, and it might well lower my general view of the legal profession."
France, supra note 1, at A10.
Some supporters of Osias, however, argue that her detractor's arguments are
not logical:
29
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some potential clients vowed never to employ her "ever."25 For all
this backlash that Osias has had to endure for pioneering her sexual
advertising campaign, however, her ads have attracted a great
number of clients. m Thus, whatever negative impact her ads may
have had on the profession as a whole have not been necessarily
factored into her own economic equation.29 Moreover, consider the
fact that Osias, in particular, probably has little regard for the
reputation of other lawyers in an industry she considers "completely
male-dominated."28

If, as [critics of Osias] suggest, the ads lessen the public's perception of
attorneys, the ads would be unsuccessful and would not bring Ms. Osias
the business they apparently are. What we have is a very clever and
creative way of obtaining business that seems to bother only the
attorney's competitors, not the potential clients.
David Reid Dillon, Female Lawyer's Ads Defended by Logic, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 21, 1995, at 2.
295 See France, supra note 1, at A10. One potential client
remarked: "If she
marketed herself differently, there is a very good chance that I would have done
business with her because I believe it is good for women to network and stay together
....But her ads are offensive to me. I would never give her a deal. Ever." Id. The
relevant question, however, is whether most of the potential clients who were
outraged by Osias's ads would have likely employed her even had she not run the
ads.
2As
noted previously, Osias's advertising campaign has been extremely
successful in attracting clients. Osias has hired several additional associates and has
spread her practice across five locations. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying
text.
29
Some commentators, however, believe that dignified ads, which help maintain
the positive reputation of the profession, also ensure a healthy bottom line that
endures long-term. Jerome E. Bogutz and William E. Hornsby, Jr., who reviewed a
survey conducted by the ABA Commission on Advertising concerning legal
advertising, advised lawyers who intend to advertise that "the study suggests that you
exercise good judgment in the quality and content of your advertising." Jerome E.
Bogutz & William E. Hornsby, Jr., Dignity in Layer Advertising: What the Survey Says,
BAR LEADER, July-Aug. 1990, at 15. As they explained:
To compromise your profession for short-term gains is short sighted. If
you believe clients want competent representation from professionals
they can respect and trust, then we believe . . . that such good
judgment will not only improve respect for you and your profession
but, in the long term, should prove positive to your bottom line.
Id.
See Wise, supra note 4, at 1. As Osias complained, "[tihis really is a maledominated industry. The men network, and they have a group, and it's a clique, and
they give each other the business." See France, supra note 1, at 1. Osias explains that
she "was trying to represent banking institutions that are run by men and owned by
men .... Men control the industries. They control the world. They control the
banks, the law firms, the accounting firms and you've got to get their attention and
you've got to get men to mentor you." Lawyer Sells Sex Appeal, supra note 25; see also
Women Spotlighted by Scandal, supra note 246 ("If I want new clients, those men aren't
gonna give me the business because I'm a woman. They're gonna give the business
to their buddies. There's an old boys' network out there.").
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The simple fact that Osias's ads have been wildly successful
undermines the notion that the problem of undignified marketing
campaigns will be self-policing. Osias's astonishing financial success
resulting from her sexual advertising campaign is perhaps the best
incentive for other struggling lawyers to implement similar marketing
Osias's success, moreover, highlights the growing
schemes.
professional isolation between individual lawyers resulting from the
decline of the profession paradigm.2 As one legal commentator has
observed, "the increase in competition for clients and fragmentation
of the bar have isolated many lawyers from their peers, and as a result
self-policing has essentially disintegrated."" The growing economic
pressures bearing down on struggling practitioners in today's highly
competitive and overpopulated legal market,"1 coupled with the rise
of the business paradigm and its accompanying relaxation of ethical
restraints, likely portends more sexual advertising in the future.
Proponents of the profession paradigm fear that a whole series
of sexually provocative ads would further erode public confidence in
lawyers and threaten people's confidence in the rule of law." Some
empirical evidence suggests, however, that there is little or no
relationship between lawyer advertising and the public image of
lawyers. 5 Practically speaking, "lawyers in the United States have
As one commentator observed:
[L]awyers must concentrate on policing their own. Each individual
lawyer must not only be held accountable for her own actions, but must
also accept the responsibility of emphasizing similar means of selfcontrol among her fellow members of the bar. Such behavior was
quite common prior to the second half of the twentieth century, and is
repeatedly stressed in modem legal ethics codes and rules [but
unfortunately is no longer the case today]."
Kessler, supra note 215, at 484.
sW Id. (arguing that, as a response, "[a]utonomous control and self-regulation ...
must be reinforced among practitioners, before the courts and state administrative
agencies choose to do it for us").

See supra notes 272-81 and accompanying text.
See Cooper & Humphreys, supra note 229, at 923 (maintaining that favorable
public image of lawyers is essential to the judicial system). But see Brooks, supra note
204, at 31. Brooks states:
[T]he fear remains that through advertising the image of the
profession will deteriorate to such an extent that attorneys will be
Yet what is so
scorned by non-attorneys as "unprofessional."
unprofessional about profit seeking? We live in a capitalistic society
made strong by its competitive spirit. Why then would one segment of
this society choose not to participate in capitalism for the sole purpose
of keeping with tradition and maintaining passive and patient lawyers?
Id.
s0s See Cebula, supra note 281, at 515 (finding that "[r]egarding the cause of the
declining image of lawyers, the advertising of legal services is not the problem");
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almost always had an image problem," even before lawyer advertising
received constitutional protection. 504 Moreover, there are many
factors, other than legal advertising, contributing to lawyers' negative
public image,- 5° such as grossly unethical behavior by certain
members of the bar."
In fact, some advertising may actually improve the public image
of lawyers. 0 A 1994 ABA study on the effects of legal advertising on

Rotunda, supra note 151, at 729 (suggesting that "extensive scientific evidence that
presently exists shows that there is, at best, no connection between advertising and
solicitation and the public attitude toward lawyers"); THE IMPACT OF ADVERTISING ON
THE IMAGE OF LAWYERS, AMERiCAN BAR ASSOCIATION 20 (1995) (arguing that "lawyer
advertising does not influence the public's image of lawyers in general, regardless of
the style and content of that advertising"); Hornsby & Schimmel, supra note 214, at
353-56 (noting that "results indicate that the types of advertisements have little or no
effect on the public's image of lawyers in general [although] lawyers who advertise in
stylish ways have superior public images when compared to lawyers in general");
Sullivan, supra note 233, at 583 (finding that "only minute percentages of the public
attribute negative views of lawyers to advertising").
Cebula, supra note 281, at 508 (determining that "the image of the legal
profession was already on a downward trend prior to the Bates decision") (citation
omitted).
s05See Martel, Jr., supra note 149, at 157 n.219 ("A distaste for attorney advertising
is but one aspect which contributes to the public's negative perception of the legal
profession [and] [f]urthermore, it can be argued that prohibiting advertising would
only eliminate one of the more visible symptoms contributing to a negative public
image."); see generally Lauren Dobrowalski, Maintainingthe Dignity of the Profession: An
InternationalPerspective on Legal Advertising and Solicitation, 12 DICK. J. INT'L L. 367
(1994) (sounding similar theme); see also Rotunda, supra note 151, at 730 ("only 2%
of the people refer to or blame advertising as the reason for their increased negative
view of lawyers"). Professor Rotunda argues:
[S]ome people do have a negative view of lawyers, but advertising
restrictions will not serve to improve the public's perception. That is
because the primary way that people learn about lawyers is through
reading and watching fictionalized portrayals of lawyers, ranging from
John Grisham's novels to Night Court and LA. Law [and, more
currently, Ally McBeal and Law and Order]. When people are asked to
name the lawyer that they most admire, frequently cited names are
Perry Mason and Matlock. Indeed, Matlock is more widely admired
than First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton. Many people think that
Matlock is a real personI
Id. at 730-31 (footnotes omitted).
306 See Martel, Jr., supra note 149, at 157
n.219 (finding that "prohibiting
advertising does not get rid of the basic cause of a negative public image, which is
that unethical lawyers degrade the profession") (citing Dobrowalski, supra note 305,
at 367).
307 See Cebula, supra note 281, at 505 (suggesting that
"lawyer advertising may well
serve to raise the image of the legal profession"); Sullivan, supra note 233, at 584
(noting one study that suggested that certain commercials "may have neutral to
positive effects upon consumers' images of the lawyers in the ad and the legal
profession in general").
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the public image of lawyers found that people who saw "stylish"m or
"sensational"'w commercials came away with the impression that
lawyers were "more intelligent."s'0 By contrast, people who saw
"talking heads" commercials, which involved lawyers at a firm
informing potential clients about the services their firm offered,
"came away with the opinion that the lawyers were less honest."0'
Some commentators have thus suggested that "if the law would like to
improve the public image of lawyers, it should get out of the way
[and] should reduce its regulatory control."01 1 Ironically, the "talking
heads" commercials were the only informative commercials of the
three, yet the people who viewed them had the least favorable view of
lawyers."3
The results of the ABA study at least support the argument that
Osias's marketing campaign will not lower the public image of
lawyers. Possibly, Osias's ads, which are accompanied by clever
captions featuring a play on words, will be considered creative and
imaginative by many members of the public.1 4 Even if that is a
stretch, it is at least fair to conclude that Osias's ads do not have the
same potential for offending the public as does the practice of direct
following an accident, the issue addressed in Went
mail solicitations
5
For it.

31

3W "Stylish" commercials included "visually attractive
imagery, actors, slogans, and
dramatizations." Rotunda, supra note 151, at 735.
3W "Sensational" commercials included such things
as "carnival music in the
background" or a dramatization of "a car hitting a bicycle rider with the sounds of a
music box interspersed with screeching tires and then the siren of an ambulance."
Id.

310See id.
311

Id.

Id. at 736. Rotunda explained that, according to an ABA study of television
advertising, those individuals
who viewed the stylish commercials - which are not in compliance
with the rules of restrictive states - had 'superior public images' of
lawyers [and thus] [tihe lesson to be learned: if you want to improve
the public image of lawyers, do the opposite of what many state bars
urge; decrease restrictions on legal advertising; use dramatization in
commercials; broadcast polished advertisements.
Id.; see also Cebula, supra note 281, at 515 (finding evidence supporting the view that
"[I]egal advertising should not be subject to more stringent regulation than other
forms of advertising") (quotation omitted).
33See
Rotunda, supra note 151, at 735.
314 See Dillon, supra note 294, at 2 (suggesting that "what
we have [in Osias's ads]
is a very clever and creative way of obtaining business that seems to bother only the
attorney's competitors, not the potential clients").
s15Indeed, at least one post-Went For It case has noted that "mere" advertising is
not the same as solicitation and that the two activities implicate different concerns.
See supra notes 162-78 and accompanying text.
1
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On the other hand, sexually provocative ads like those used by
Osias seem to go beyond stylish or sensational ads, which may be, at
worst, simply tacky or tawdry. Osias's ads, even if not offensive, may
still be considered highly embarrassing, and hence undignified. As
one legal observer, having Osias's marketing campaign in mind,
argued, "[a]dvertising that is so repugnant that it serves as an
embarrassment to the profession should not be tolerated."' 6
Several problems arise with trying to regulate undignified ads,
however. First, as some observers suggest, there is an inherent
31 7
difficulty in defining "dignity," which "is not a self-defining term."
Second, even if it can be agreed that Osias's ads are undignified, it is
unclear whether states have a substantial interest in regulating
undignified ads to preserve the professional image of lawyers, even
after Went ForIt."" Third, and finally, even if constitutional difficulties
could be avoided, simply because Osias's ads could be regulated does
not mean that they should be regulated.
Banning undignified ads may help preserve the public image of
lawyers, but it does not follow that the interests of consumers would
correspondingly be advanced by such regulations. 1 9 If, in an
unregulated market, Osias is permitted to use any marketing
campaign she desires (including using sex to sell her legal services),
prospective clients can gain useful information about what kind of
person she is and, accordingly, can make an informed decision as to
whether they want to hire that kind of lawyer.-' Prospective clients
316

Martel, Jr., supra note 149, at 156 (suggesting that "additional restrictions on

[lal~er] advertising are necessary").
Rotunda, supra note 151, at 734. As one commentator argues, "it is impossible
to conclude, on the basis of anything but taste and personal preference, whether a
particular form of advertising is dignified." Watkins, supra note 197, at 776 ("Like
obscenity, dignity is in the eye of the beholder."). It is not clear that this argument is
compelling, however. No doubt it is difficult to define "dignity" given its subjective
component, but the suggestion that certain ads can never be branded as undignified
seems to be an extreme view. The law draws lines all the time. Besides, under the
profession paradigm there would be no difficulty in agreeing that Osias's ads are
undignified and should be regulated. Interestingly, several terms used in the
profession/business debate are claimed to be like obscenity, and thus difficult to
define, including the term "profession," see supra note 209 and accompanying text,
and now the term "dignity."
3:8

See supraPart II.

9 See Rotunda, supra note 151, at 734 ("The law's emphasis on dignity
does not
serve the interests of [prospective clients but rather] simply ignores the[ir] interests
and needs.").
The Court's decision in Bates, after all, subscribes to the view that "consumers
in a more open market would be able to make informed decisions regarding the
purchase of legal services." Pearce, supra note 200, at 1249. Although the Court
agreed that advertising may sometimes highlight irrelevant factors, the Court found
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who believe her marketing strategy is repugnant, and utterly
unprofessional, will not hire her. Regulations forbidding all lawyers
from employing sexually provocative marketing campaigns, however,
would make Osias appear more dignified than she would in an
unregulated market. 32 1
Such regulations enforce an artificial
sameness among lawyers and suppress useful information that
prospective clients would rely on in hiring a lawyer.2
In fact, if
"dignity" really is as difficult to define as some suggest, then letting
consumers decide for themselves which lawyer ads are dignified may
be an ideal solution to the problem 3
that "it seems peculiar to deny the consumer, on the ground that the information is
incomplete, at least some of the relevant information needed to reach an informed
decision." Bates v. Florida Bar Ass'n, 433 U.S. 350, 374 (1977). As one commentator
observed, "[i] t is ironic that in Went For It the Florida Bar suppressed information
about the legal system to improve the public image of lawyers. This logic is
counterintuitive. To promote the legal system.... consumers should be given more
information, not less." Zelenko, supra note 150, at 1242.
321 Professor Rotunda uses the example of a Wisconsin lawyer named Ken
Hur
who is well-known for running a series of, arguably, undignified television
advertisements.
See Rotunda, supra note 151, at 732. For example, in one
commercial, Hur "is playing the banjo while singing off key, and asking prospective
clients to hire him, while promising the initial meeting costs 'just ten bucks.' He tells
the viewer that he needs the money to take more banjo lessons." Id. at 732-33.
Professor Rotunda explains:
Hur pokes fun at the legal profession, and - by his constant reference
to 'just ten bucks" - he appeals to individuals who may feel overawed
by lawyers, or who believe that lawyers are too stuffy.
His
advertisements attract such prospective clients who otherwise would
feel ill at ease. If the law prohibited Ken Hur's advertisements, it would
be as if the law forced him to dress in a three-piece suit, both
metaphorically and literally. The type of client who would prefer to
hire someone like Ken Hur would be out of luck.
Id. at 733. The same applies to Osias. If the law prohibited her from using sexually
provocative ads, clients who would be against hiring such a lawyer would not have
relevant information at their disposal to make an informed choice.
322 Id. at 734 ("When the law prohibits [advertisements] in the
name of dignity, it
does not serve the interests of prospective clients who rely on [advertisements] to
help them pick a lawyer.").
3 3 See Brooks, supra note 204, at 29 (arguing that "[a]dvertisements
that are
misleading can be regulated through the state bar, while those that are only
distasteful will be left to the judgment of the consumer"). As perverse as it may
sound, allowing Osias to use sex to sell legal services may actually help boost the
reputation of some lawyers. That is, if Osias's ads are as repugnant and undignified
as some of her critics charge they are, then those lawyers who uphold lofty
professional standards of conduct will only appear that much more respectable
relative to Osias. Outlawing sexually provocative ads, by contrast, would enforce
conformity among members of the bar and hoist Osias to a level of professionalism
that is perhaps not warranted. Rather than discouraging Osias, members of the bar
might want to encourage her advertising campaign, as non-intuitive as that may
sound.
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An approach to sexually provocative advertising that strives to
keep prospective clients informed, moreover, dovetails with the
Court's anti-paternalistic approach to its advertising cases, including
its general skepticism of "regulations that seek to keep people in the
dark for what the government perceives to be their own good."2 4
The Court has repeatedly emphasized how "the free flow of
information is indispensable"3 25 in a free enterprise economy and how
advertising, "however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem,"
nevertheless contributes to "intelligent and well-informed" consumer
decisions.2 6
Unfortunately, sexually provocative ads do not necessarily
contribute to intelligent and well-informed consumer decisions as a
whole. While Osias's sexually provocative ads might provide insight
into the kind of person she is, her ads do not necessarily promote
commercial intercourse. It is difficult to conclude that Osias's ads
provide consumers of legal services the information that they really
need to make well-informed choices: "clean, factual information"
about the quality of her legal services. 7 As the New York Grievance
Committee complained, Osias's ads contain "extraneous content not
designed to educate legal consumers to an awareness of legal needs
or to provide information relative to the selection of appropriate
counsel.,,328

Rather

than offering factual

information,

Osias's

lascivious ads are simply irrational appeals to primal sexual urges.
Then again, although no lawyer has used sex to sell legal services
before, Osias's brand of advertising is not qualitatively different from
other legal advertising that appeals to emotions. In fact, the use of
irrational appeals to sell legal services is rampant among lawyers
today. 29 What is so puzzling about Osias's commercial success,
324

44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996).
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer

425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976).

Council, Inc.,

Id.
See Battey, supra note 242, at 315.
38 Scott Brede, Fleshing Out New Clients, CONN.
L. TRIB., Aug. 25, 1997, at 1.
39
One commentator bemoans how the use of images to sell
legal services is
rampant among lawyers, as he complains that
[d]epictions of heavily bandaged people in wheelchairs, wrecked
automobiles, speeding ambulances, worried doctors, police officers
writing accident reports, helicopters (presumably rushing victims to the
hospital) and frantic family members contribute absolutely nothing to
the flow of valid commercial discourse, but instead effectively push the
emotional buttons of the persons most in need of clean, factual
information.
Battey, supra note 242, at 315 (noting that "[words... are only one component of
an advertisement [and that] [i]mages in many cases present the more powerful
326
327
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however, is that she not only gained clients solely on the strength of
her sex appeal, but that the clients who were attracted to her firm
were highly sophisticated business clients, including banking
executives who are well educated regarding legal services.m The
Court's trust in the ability of consumers to evaluate information
independently and to make informed choices when choosing legal
services seems to be misplaced, at least as Osias's example, is
concerned."3 '
Consumers of legal services, in fact, may not even care about
informative legal ads. As one of the previously noted studies
revealed, people who viewed informative "talking heads" commercials
thought less of lawyers than did those people who viewed stylish or
sensational ads." 2
Perhaps consumers of legal services, even
sophisticated clients, are seeking creative and intriguing lawyers
rather than the stereotypical stuffy lawyer. If that is the case, then
Osias is surely satisfying their desires.
Whatever the explanation, Osias has not been harmed by her
decision to use sex to sell legal services, as her commercial success
copiously demonstrates. And, as the evidence suggests, Osias's ads
hardly threaten the public image of lawyers. Rather, Osias has only
drawn ire from bar leaders and other lawyers in the industry who
have protested that her ads are wholly unprofessional and degrade
the public image of the legal profession.Mostly, competing
lawyers, not potential clients, have found fault with Osias's marketing
campaign. If anything, the attacks against Osias by the bar elite tend
only to confirm the profession paradigm's proclivity to serve elitist
interests by restraining natural market forces to keep certain
members of the profession down. Osias's response to the bar leaders
who have denounced her ads as undignified is, simply, that they are

message, and here again, abuse is rampant").

See Hand, supranote 22, at 19.
As one commentator notes, "Our First Amendment was founded on the
principle that free speech and the total dissemination of information would enable
citizens to choose wisely." Marc David Lawlor, Note, Ivory Tower Paternalism and
Lawyer Advertising: The Case of Florida Bar v. Went For It, 40 ST. Louis L.J. 895, 923
(1996). It is difficult, however, to conclude that those Osias clients who enlisted her
services solely on the basis of her sexually provocative ads were choosing wisely.
See supra notes 307-13 and accompanying text.
The divergent reaction between lawyers and potential clients in Osias's case is
no surprise. Studies have consistently revealed that when it comes to opinions over
attorney advertising, lawyers tend to have a "negative to neutral" view, whereas
consumers' views range from "neutral to positive." Rotunda, supra note 151, at 730
n.99.
33
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'Jealous" of her commercial success,4 a perhaps fitting retort for a

lawyer who fully espouses the business paradigm and reaps its
benefits.
IV. CONCLUSION

In the end, the story of Osias's marketing campaign speaks
volumes to the profession-versus-business debate. As this Article has
explored, her marketing campaign would be professionally and
commercially perilous in a legal environment dominated by the
profession paradigm. Osias's example thus attests to the rise of the
business paradigm in the law simply by virtue of her astounding
commercial success. At the same time, however, her success does not
sound the death knell for the profession paradigm. Many lawyers
surveyed expressed their sharp disagreement, and sometimes fervent
outrage, over Osias's ad campaign, and many believe she should be
disciplined.3 5 The New York state bar even considered leveling
disciplinary charges against Osias before eventually opting to refrain
out of the concern that any attempt to sanction her would only
generate additional publicity.'-" Although the profession paradigm
has declined in the last several decades, and lawyers now operate in a
more commercially tolerant environment under the business
paradigm, it is equally clear that the tugs and pulls of professionalism
still constrain lawyers' behavior.
Ultimately, the profession-versus-business debate is not a false
dilemma. Law is neither a profession nor a business.-38 It is both.
Law is still a profession as lawyers continue to feel the pressures of
conforming to professional standards of conduct, particularly given
the threat of disciplinary action. At the same time, law is also a
ss4Networking, supra note 238, at A10.
s5 See supra note 314.
6 See supra note 315.
:37 Even the Court in Bates, while ushering in a new era
of commercialism in the
law, recognized that the profession paradigm would not be completely supplanted by
the business paradigm. The Court stated that
[w]e suspect that, with advertising, most lawyers will behave as they
always have: They will abide by their solemn oaths to uphold the
integrity and honor of their profession and of the legal system. For
every attorney who overreaches through advertising, there will be
thousands of others who will be candid and honest and straightforward.
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 379 (1977).
sm See Powell, supra note 228, at 270 (recognizing that law has several dimensions,
including both professional and business dimensions); see also Pearce, supra note 200,
at 1264 (explaining the view that declares law as both a business and a profession).
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business and, especially in recent years, lawyers are increasingly
importing commercialism into their practices due to the weakening
constraints of the profession paradigm. Actually, law has always been
a business and its commercial aspects are simply becoming more
visible in recent years with the rise of the business paradigm.
As this Article has demonstrated, the rise of the business
paradigm has had a salutary effect on the law, even if, at minimum, it
simply exposed some of the dubious and hypocritical assumptions
underlying the profession paradigm. Indeed, if anything, breaking
more of the shackles of the profession paradigm could yield still
greater benefits for clients and lawyers alike by providing consumers
with relevant information in choosing a lawyer and by allowing
fledgling lawyers to compete successfully for clients against more
established lawyers in a particular market. The challenge for the
legal community in the future will be either to achieve a balance
between the profession and business paradigms in order to moderate,
and possibly reconcile, the competing paradigmatic values or,
perhaps better yet, to conclude that the profession paradigm is wholly
antiquated and should be cast out altogether. However the challenge
is resolved, it is one that confronts all lawyers today and will affect
how both the public and lawyers regard the law and what they will
come to expect of it.

